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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS*
DRU STEVENSON"
North Carolina is one of the only states to have a statutory
definition of voluntary consent for police searches; it essentially
codified the Supreme Court's Bustamonte rule. In theory, this
statute could eventually face a constitutional challenge if the
Supreme Court adopted a requirement of informed consent-
police warnings of the right to refuse a search-as many have
urged. Considering this possibility as a hypothetical, it seems
strange that conventional Fourth Amendment analysis has
largely ignored whether challenged state actions are legislative,
executive, or judicial; attention has focused instead on federalism
concerns, interpretive approaches, and tradeoffs between public
safety and individual privacy. Nevertheless, there are both policy
reasons and anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Supreme
Court should, and in fact occasionally does, defer to legislatures
in certain matters of criminal procedure, even when it would not
defer to identical decisions by police. The potential clash between
this statute and constitutional doctrine illustrates these points
nicely. This Article uses this localized example as a launching
point to address the larger issue of how state legislation can color
the Supreme Court's analysis. Separation of powers is an
important but unexplored component of criminal procedure, and
this Article is a first foray into this inquiry. This missing piece of
Fourth Amendment analysis has broad implications for many
areas of criminal procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1974,1 North Carolina codified the holding of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 statutorily defining
what constitutes valid consent to a search in sections 15A-221 3 and
15A-2224 of the North Carolina General Statutes. It is the only state
to have done so,' and this remains a unique feature of its criminal
procedure. Without explanation, the North Carolina legislature at the
last minute dropped a section of the bill that would have required
police to inform suspects that they had a right to refuse consent
1. See Act of Jan. 16, 1974, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 493 (amending the state criminal
procedure laws).
2. 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that a subject's voluntary consent to a search
is not invalidated simply because he does not know that he can refuse to consent).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-221 (2011).
4. Id. § 15A-222.
5. See Jessica Y. Harrison, Comment, A Statutory Proposal to Clarify the Meaning of
Consent in Wisconsin Search and Seizure Law, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 403, 424 n.169 (2000)
(asserting that North Carolina is the only state to statutorily define "consent" to search
and seizure). For a non-legislative federal example of defining consent, see MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Part III, Mil. R. Evid. 314(e) (2012).
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without fear of retaliatory action.6 It is hard to measure the impact of
this omission; it appears from the reported cases that North Carolina
police began using consent-waiver forms regularly around 1979,7
which inform suspects of their right to refuse the search. It also
appears that suspects routinely consent anyway.8
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area have been generally
consistent since Bustamonte, so North Carolina's statute remains in
harmony with federal constitutional rules. North Carolina state courts
regularly cite both Bustamonte and their own statute in resolving
consent cases, 9 so the statute has not yielded outcomes that diverge
from cases in the federal courts or most other states.
In theory, this alignment could change if the Supreme Court took
a step forward in its determination of voluntary consent. Presently, a
sudden change to Bustamonte seems very unlikely because the rule
has proved very stable and workable for courts, especially compared
to other criminal procedure rules. At the same time, a few states have
started requiring informed consent for warrantless police searches, °
so it is theoretically possible that this new approach could win out
6. Compare H.B. 256, 1973 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1974) (requiring an
officer to inform the individual that he is under no obligation to consent to a search)
(adopted Mar. 5, 1974), with H.B. 256, 1.973 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1974)
(removing that requirement from the bill text) (adopted Apr. 8, 1974).
7. See infra note 90 and corresponding text.
8. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-
Abiding Persons, 99 GEo. L.J. 1517, 1523 n.19 (2011); Brian R. Gallini, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte: History's Unspoken Fourth Amendment Anomaly, 79 TENN. L. REV. 233,
233-34 (2012); Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: 'Consent' Within the Fourth
Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 9 (2010); Ric
Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005).
9. See, e.g., State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239-40, 536 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2000); State v.
Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 798, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1997); State v. Stover, 200 N.C. App. 506,
513-514, 685 S.E.2d 127, 133 (2009); State v. Harper, 158 N.C. App. 595, 602, 582 S.E.2d
62, 67 (2003); State v. Graham, 149 N.C. App. 215, 218-19, 562 S.E.2d 286, 288 (2002);
State v. Mandina, 91 N.C. App. 686, 695,373 S.E.2d 155,161 (1988).
10. This is an arguably nascent trend, but all the changes are heading in the same
direction. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1A-10 to 11 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring the
operator of a motor vehicle to provide written consent stating that she understands that
she can refuse to consent to a search); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.1 ("A search of a dwelling
based on consent shall not be valid under this rule unless the person giving the consent
was advised of the right to refuse consent."); Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 549 (Miss.
1983) (requiring the person consenting to a search to be "cognizant of her rights in the
premises when the officer proposed to her ... to make the search without a warrant"
(emphasis in original) (quoting Smith v. State, 98 So. 344, 345 (Miss. 1923))); State v.
Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 2002) (noting that, under the New Jersey Constitution, "any
consent given by an individual to a police officer to conduct a warrantless search must be
given knowingly and voluntarily" (citing State v. Johnson, 436 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975))).
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sometime in the future. Even though the Court has not signaled any
intention of reversing Bustamonte, such an eventuality is at least
possible enough to furnish a useful hypothetical, allowing
consideration of a larger issue. More importantly, the growing
variance in state laws on this point highlights a larger issue-the level
of deference federal courts should give state legislatures that attempt
to codify rights or procedures protecting those rights.
In this sense, the North Carolina statute poses an intriguing
question regarding the relationship between federal criminal
procedure and state legislation, which implicates issues of federalism,
incorporation, and separation of powers. Conventional wisdom would
suggest that statutes delimiting search and seizure law can serve as a
floor but not a ceiling-that is, if the Supreme Court were to relax the
standard for valid consent, North Carolina's stricter standard would
still prevail, as states can afford greater rights to defendants than the
Federal Constitution requires. In contrast, most would assume that if
the Court raised the standard for valid consent, perhaps by requiring
Miranda-like warnings of the suspect's right to refuse a warrantless
search, this would invalidate North Carolina's statute, as it falls short
of such a requirement.
This Article challenges the last point. The literature on
constitutional criminal procedure has focused exclusively on
incorporation and federalism issues and has ignored the role that
separation of powers concerns may play in the Court's decisions
about what procedural safeguards to impose on the states." The vast
majority of Supreme Court decisions on the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments have addressed only state police action, an executive
branch function, or a state judicial rule about admissibility of
evidence-rarely do the cases involve a statute enacted by an elected
legislature. Moreover, the Supreme Court's mantra that "the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct"' 2 suggests that
exclusion-which is always the sole remedy for searches premised on
11. One of the only exceptions is Richard C. Worf, The Case For Rational Basis
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURo L. REV. 93, 109-10
(2007) (arguing that legislatures should decide search and seizure limits rather than the
judiciary). This Article takes a much less extreme view: rather than arguing that search-
and-seizure rules should be almost the exclusive domain of the legislature, as Worf claims,
the idea set forth here is that courts should (and already do, without expressly admitting
it) give some weight or deference to legislative enactments in this area, but only as one
factor among others.
12. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984); accord Davis v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 (2009); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995).
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involuntary consent-is less appropriate where the legislative branch
has already regulated police conduct.
Although this argument contradicts the prevailing view of
commentators, there is some support within Supreme Court opinions.
The Court often defers to Congress or state legislatures in criminal
procedure cases, but has not acknowledged that it has a general
preference for such deference. It also frequently cites trends in state
law to justify a break with its own precedent or its invalidation of a
statutory outlier. 3 Yet the literature has largely ignored the fact that
varying levels of deference inform the Court's decisions about
applying the Bill of Rights to the states. In line with the Court's usual
separation of powers analysis, state legislatures receive more
deference than state police (executives) or state judiciaries. 4 Such
deference is not dispositive; it is not the sole factor, or even the most
important factor, in a case, but it colors the Court's analysis. In other
words, it is a mistake to assume that a decision about consent and
searches depends entirely on the text of the Fourth Amendment, or
even the entrenched jurisprudence surrounding the amendment, such
as using the exclusionary rule as the remedy for violations. These are
important factors, but it also matters which branch of the state
government is facing the constitutional challenge.
Even where these differing levels of deference are not explicit,
some of the canons of statutory interpretation push in this direction.
For example, the avoidance canon,15 which instructs judges to avoid
finding a statute unconstitutional if there are other grounds for
disposing of the case, indirectly gives more incremental deference16 to
13. See infra Part II.C. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002) (citing
the national trend in state legislatures to prohibit the use of the death penalty for mentally
retarded criminals as reason to invalidate a Virginia law).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See Bd. of Trs. of Ind. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Fund v. Grannan, 578 N.E.2d 371, 375
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); In re Belk, 107 N.C. App. 448, 455, 420 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1992);
NORMAN SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:11 (7th ed. 2007) ("In the same spirit a court will not address
constitutional claims when the case can be properly disposed of on nonconstitutional
grounds .... It is presumed that the legislature acted with integrity and with an honest
purpose to keep within constitutional limits.").
16. For discussion of the concept of incremental deference in other contexts, see
Charles H. Brower II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the Law of State
Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 918-20 (2005) (discussing deference to the actions
of foreign states under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Hon. Andrew M. Mead,
Abuse of Discretion: Maine's Application of a Malleable Appellate Standard, 57 ME. L.
REV. 519, 539 (2005) (discussing deference as it applies to appellate court review of trial
court decisions); Aman S. Patel, Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and
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statutes than to police protocols, as it applies to the former and not
the latter. In addition, the fact that legislation is text means that it
contains some inevitable ambiguity in the verbiage and has room for
interpretation by a federal court wanting to avoid a constitutional
collision with the states;17 discrete police actions lack this advantage.
This is not to say that North Carolina's statute would inevitably
survive a constitutional challenge if the Court took a new turn in this
area. Rather, the point is that North Carolina's codification of
consent (as well as other features of search and seizure law) makes
survival of a challenge more possible or likely. As such, it highlights
the overdue observation that separation of powers concerns can
factor into the Court's application of the Fourth Amendment to state
actions, and to a lesser extent, the application of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as well. I believe this deference stems primarily from
separation of powers concerns, and only secondarily from federalism
concerns.
The same argument would apply to legislative enactments in
other states that address any point of law overlapping with Supreme
Court precedents. To illustrate, consider a far-removed example: at
least twenty-two states enacted legislation18 reacting to the Court's
2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 9 All these statutes
pertain to eminent domain, but some codify the Court's holding,
while others purport to annul Kelo for property within that state.
Growing Judicial Deference to Police Judgment, 45 CRIM. L.Q. 198, 226 (2001) (describing
courts' deferential approach to police action regarding Terry searches and seizures).
17. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) ("[S]tatutes will be interpreted to
avoid constitutional difficulties."); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 15, § 45:11 ("[A] court
should construe legislative enactments to avoid constitutional difficulties if possible [and
should,] [iun considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment ... exercise
appropriate restraint in recognition of the principle of separation of powers."); see also S.
Blvd. Video & News, Inc. v. Charlotte Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 129 N.C. App. 282, 289,
498 S.E.2d 623, 628 (1998) (noting that "statutes relating to the same subject should be
construed ... in such a way as to give effect.., to all provisions without destroying the
meaning of the statutes involved" (citation omitted)); Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v.
Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 510-11, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1993)
("This Court presumes that any act promulgated by the General Assembly is
constitutional and resolves all doubt in favor of its constitutionality." (citation omitted));
N.C. E. Mun. Power Agency v. Wake Cnty., 100 N.C. App. 693, 699, 398 S.E.2d 486, 490
(1990) ("[I]f the meaning [of a statute whose validity is at issue] is clear from reading the
words of the Constitution, we should not search for a meaning elsewhere.").
18. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (providing a state-by-state survey of post-Kelo
legislation and discussing the impact of various enactments); Dru Stevenson, A Million
Little Takings, 14 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 19-31 (2011) (discussing how post-Kelo
enactments inadvertently affect the legality of state IOLTA programs).
19. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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When government takings within these states reach the Supreme
Court for review, there is now a significant wrinkle to what otherwise
might be a strictly constitutional analysis-the import of the state's
new statute about the permissibility of certain takings. It seems clear
that the Court cannot simply ignore a relevant state statute in its
analysis, even though the question on appeal is likely to be primarily
constitutional, and the statute itself may not be the end of the matter.
Yet the academic literature has hitherto ignored this problem,
treating constitutional questions in a more monochromatic way. This
Article argues that such legislation must color the analysis, and the
analysis must differ from scenarios where the Court reviews state
action (such as property takings) in the absence of such enactments.
The argument here proceeds from the context of criminal
procedure-using North Carolina's statute as a starting point-but
the idea would apply to other areas of law as well.
A more recent example, for purposes of illustration, is the
clandestine police practice of using GPS tracking devices on the
vehicles of suspects. The Supreme Court's January 2012 decision in
United States v. Jones2° held that installing the GPS device constituted
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, requiring a warrant.
Before the ruling, this was a common law enforcement tactic-the
FBI later announced that it had turned off three thousand GPS
tracking devices on private cars in the wake of the Court's decision.21
Even so, the Court's opinion left significant unanswered questions
about the legality of such tracking in other circumstances, such as
using a car's manufacturer-installed GPS system; despite the
unanimous vote, the split of concurring opinions left uncertainty
about what rule the Court would apply in future cases. Since the
decision, at least two states, Virginia and New Hampshire, have
legislation pending that would require warrants for police to use GPS
tracking devices on the vehicles of suspects.22 This creates the same
scenario analyzed in this Article-how the Supreme Court would, or
should, respond where a state legislature has filled in gaps in the
20. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
21. See Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court
Ruling, WALL STREET J. DIGITS BLOG (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM),
http:/f/blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-
supreme-court-ruling/.
22. See, e.g., Ted Seifer, GPS Tracking, Police and Warrants, N.H. UNION LEADER,
Jan 31, 2012, at 1; Va. House Passes Bill To Restrict GPS Tracking, DAILY PRESS, Feb. 14,
2012, at A3.
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Court's constitutional jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment
questions.
An anticipated objection to my thesis is a well-known
counterexample, the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Dickerson v.
United States, 23 which invalidated a Congressional attempt to overturn
Miranda legislatively through 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The case involved a
defendant charged with bank robbery and related offenses, who
sought to suppress his own confession on the grounds that he had not
received Miranda warnings before confessing. 24 This Article deals
with Dickerson more extensively in Part II.A below, but the objection
is important enough to merit a brief comment here. The majority in
Dickerson emphasized that it was treating the matter as a special case
of stare decisis25 due to the universal entrenchment of Miranda
warnings in our culture. From the standpoint of judicial deference to
Congress, Dickerson is an exception, not the rule. Moreover, the
statute itself was somewhat of a legislative orphan; 26 for thirty years
from its enactment to the Court's decision, the Department of Justice
had ordered federal prosecutors not to enforce it and had even urged
the Court in Dickerson to ignore it.27 In an unusually brash move, the
Fourth Circuit on its own initiative invoked the statute to overturn
three decades of Supreme Court precedent, leaving the Supreme
Court in the awkward position of having to solicit someone
uninvolved in the case (Professor Paul Cassell from the University of
Utah) to argue in support of the judgment below. 2 Neither of the
litigants themselves-the Department of Justice or the defendant-
had wanted to bring § 3501 into the case. 29 Dickerson is, in this sense,
23. 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (holding that Miranda warnings are an entrenched part of
the American legal system).
24. Id. at 432.
25. See id. at 443 ("Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its
resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare
decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now."); see also id. at 444 ("In sum, we conclude
that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda
ourselves.").
26. See generally Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and
the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999) (discussing the Justice
Department's treatment of § 3501 since its inception, including its shift from supporting
the statute to opposing it in the Dickerson case).
27. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 681-82 (4th Cir. 1999); see also
KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS 206 (2002) ("During the Clinton
Administration... Attorney General Reno had taken the extraordinary step of directing
federal prosecutors around the country not to employ the statute.").
28. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 n.7.
29. See id.
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a unique event in the history of the Court and is therefore an outlier,
not a benchmark that should be fatal to the argument here.3" Finally,
Dickerson involved the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourth,
which is the primary focus of this Article. As discussed below, the
Court explicitly treats Fourth Amendment issues more flexibly, and
less reverently, than issues invoking the Fifth. Protecting Fifth
Amendment trial rights is arguably more suitable for the judiciary,
while protecting against overly-intrusive investigations (the Fourth
Amendment's theme) could easily be a legislative task. Dickerson is
an obvious counterexample to the argument here, but is also easily
distinguishable and not very representative of the norm.
The theory proposed here builds partly on recent work by
Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz, but expands the analysis of a specific
issue-constitutional challenges to state criminal procedure
enactments-and applies the new insights to the important example
of North Carolina's consent law. In a pair of articles appearing in the
Stanford Law Review,3 Professor Rosenkranz argues convincingly
that nearly every clause or provision of the Constitution applies to or
binds either the President, Congress, the judiciary, or their
counterparts on the state level.32 A combination of grammatical-
syntactic features and other contextual clues reveal the subjects and
objects in each instance.33 An early Supreme Court decision, for
example, held that passive-voice verbs in the Constitution apply to
the federal government and not to the states.3 4 Rosenkranz
demonstrates that on the federal level, only Congress can actually
30. Kenneth Starr adds to this characterization the fact that the Court was in a "self-
defense" mode in Dickerson, which in itself is relatively unusual in the Court's history.
STARR, supra note 27, at 205-06 ("To many, the 1968 law represented 'an act of defiance
by the Congress, ridiculing the Court, an unbelievable hostility to the Court.' "). This is
the opposite situation from one where the legislation under review was in conformity with
the Supreme Court's current rule at the time of enactment.
31. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1005 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution]; Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010) [hereinafter
Rosenkranz, Subjects of the Constitution]. Subjects of the Constitution is the most
downloaded article about constitutional interpretation and judicial review in the history of
the Social Science Research Network. SSRN Top Downloads: All Time Hits-Top 10
Papers for Journal of U.S. Constitutional Law, SSRN.COM,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/topten/topTenResults.cfm?groupingld=945709&netorjrnl=jrnl
(last visited May 8, 2012).
32. See Rosenkranz, Subjects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1222.
33. See Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1013-14 (pointing
out that Chief Justice Marshall first developed the idea of "semantic consistency" as an
analytical tool of constitutional interpretation).
34. Id. (quoting Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
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violate the First Amendment35 (because the Amendment mentions
Congress), while only the Executive can violate the Fourth
Amendment's search-and-seizure clause36 (as only the executive
would have been doing searches), and only the courts can violate the
probable cause provision regarding warrants37 (as only magistrates
grant warrants). The lines are somewhat blurry when courts
incorporate provisions from the Bill of Rights against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, a point that this Article
develops more fully. Rosenkranz is apparently the first scholar to
observe that various provisions of the Bill of Rights apply only, or at
least primarily, to certain branches of government, even where such
constraints are not explicit in the text, and that this insight should
(and historically did) influence the approach courts take in criminal
procedure cases.
This Article continues with the idea, shared by Rozenkranz, that
separation of powers is an important but neglected area of Fourth
Amendment analysis, and attempts to fill that gap concerning state
legislation, especially on the issue of consent. At the same time, the
argument here is not dependent on Rosenkranz' work, even though it
finds support there. One could reject his position-that all clauses of
the Constitution have particular branches of the government as
subjects-and still embrace this Article's central claim that Fourth
Amendment analysis should take some cognizance of whether the
challenged state action is purely legislative, executive, or judicial.
This Article is primarily descriptive but includes a modest
normative component. Descriptively, it explains North Carolina's
unique consent statute, including its legislative history, and highlights
how the statute has affected judicial decisions in the state. The statute
also provides an example for describing the complex relationship
between the separation of powers and the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states, an issue that up to now has not received adequate
attention. Even if the Supreme Court were never to budge from its
holding in Bustamonte, the issue raised here about incremental
deference to the legislature deserves more recognition. The
normative angle of this Article is the suggestion that the role of
35. See Rosenkranz, Subjects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1253 ("The first
question of First Amendment judicial review must be: who has violated the First
Amendment? And as a matter of text and grammar, there is only one possible answer:
'Congress.' ").
36. See id. at 1239-41; Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1033-
35.
37. See Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1036-39.
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separation of powers, and varying levels of deference to state action,
become more explicit in the Supreme Court's analysis in its criminal
procedure decisions. Even though this Article focuses on North
Carolina's consent statute specifically, there are countless other
statutes codifying judicial rulings pertaining to criminal procedure-
as well as other unrelated areas of law-to which this thesis should
apply.38
This Article contends that there is reason to believe that the
Supreme Court shows deference to state legislatures when
considering the constitutionality of state statutes in the context of the
Fourth Amendment. To illustrate how this deference functions and
the reasons behind it, this Article poses a hypothetical based upon a
North Carolina statute defining what constitutes .valid consent to a
search. While North Carolina's consent statute codifies current
Supreme Court consent jurisprudence, this Article poses the question:
"How would the North Carolina statute be treated if the Supreme
Court consent jurisprudence changed, raising the floor for what
constitutes valid consent under the Fourth Amendment?" This
Article then argues that there is reason to believe that the Supreme
Court would show some deference to the North Carolina legislature
when assessing the constitutionality of North Carolina's consent
statute.
Analysis proceeds as follows: Part I sets the stage with a
background of North Carolina's consent statute, the Supreme Court's
Bustamonte decision, and relevant developments in the law since.
Included in this background is a survey of states that have recently
adopted various informed consent requirements for police searches,
which may signal a trend. The primary utility of this analysis of North
Carolina's statute is that it serves as a robust illustration of larger
points about judicial deference to legislatures that I will discuss later.
Part II foregrounds the varying levels of deference that inform courts
in applying the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. This discussion begins
by exploring particularly relevant cases where the Supreme Court has
either rejected or capitulated to legislative attempts to define
boundaries of Fourth Amendment protections, and then proceeds to
38. See, e.g., Michael Stockalper, Is There a Foreign "Right" of Price Discrimination
Under United States Copyright Law? An Examination of the First-Sale Doctrine as Applied
to Gray-Market Goods, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 513, 516 n.20
(2010) (noting examples of legislation codifying court rulings); Maria-Daniel Asturias,
Note, Burden Shifting and Faulty Assumptions: The Impact of Horne v. Flores on State
Obligations to Adolescent ELLs under the EEOA, 55 How. L.J. 607, 616 (2012) (noting
that the EEOA codified prior court decisions).
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revisit traditional policy rationales for judicial deference to
legislatures. Part I also documents the Court's occasional reliance on
the acts of state legislatures as a type of persuasive authority to
bolster its own conclusions. The discussion then turns to the
properties of legislative text, especially definitional statutes, which
make this type of state action less susceptible to judicial review and
consequent invalidation. Starting with the avoidance canon and the
doctrine of severability, this Section explains the pragmatic or
logistical problems with a court reaching or overturning North
Carolina's statute. Part III briefly revisits the North Carolina statute
to illustrate how the foregoing points could apply in practice. If the
Supreme Court were to review a statute like this that did not
necessarily comport with its preferred rule at the time, it could either
use the avoidance canon to skirt the discrepancy, or it could decide to
capitulate on the grounds that the rule is coming from a legislature
rather than from the executive branch or the police in particular. The
Conclusion provides a brief recap and conclusion, pointing out
implications of this Article that should be the subject of future
research.
I. BACKGROUND
As mentioned at the outset, North Carolina provides a localized
example that can serve as a launching point to address the larger issue
of how state legislation can color the Supreme Court's analysis. It is
one of the only states to have a statutory definition of voluntary
consent for police searches; it essentially codifies the Supreme Court's
Bustamonte rule. Hypothetically, this statute could eventually face a
constitutional challenge if the Supreme Court adopted a requirement
of informed consent-police warnings of the right to refuse a
search-as many have urged. This Section introduces the broader
landscape of consent-based searches under Bustamonte and then
explains how North Carolina's statute fits within this area of law-
and how it illustrates a larger issue in constitutional jurisprudence
that has received inadequate attention in the literature.
A. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte39 involved a warrantless police search
of a vehicle. The 2:40 AM traffic stop was routine at the outset,
39. 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973) (confirming that searches conducted "pursuant to a
valid consent" are constitutionally permissible, and discussing what constitutes
"voluntary" consent).
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occasioned by a burned out headlight and license plate light.4" The
driver had no license, and the only one of the six men in the car who
could verify his own identity was the brother of the car's absent
owner.4 This passenger, Alcala, cheerfully agreed to let the officer
search the car, and even assisted in the search by unlocking the trunk
and glove compartment.4 2 Under the rear left seat lay three stolen
checks.4 3 The checks provided the basis for charging another
passenger, Bustamonte, with their theft.' Before trial, Bustamonte
moved to suppress the checks, contending that the police obtained
the checks through an unconstitutional search and seizure. The
judge denied the motion and Bustamonte was convicted of possessing
a check with intent to defraud.46 A subsequent habeas petition
brought the consent issue up the chain of appeals.47
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require a person's awareness of his right to refuse
consent to warrantless police searches.48 The court concluded Alcala
had not voluntarily consented because he lacked this knowledge,
despite his verbal assent and lack of police coercion. 49 The Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the due process clause
does not require the state to prove that a person knew of his right to
refuse consent to a warrantless search.5" The Court also explicitly
rejected the option of requiring Miranda-style warning of a person's
right to refuse consent, and instead adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test to assess in each case the voluntariness of the
acquiescence.5' The Court held that a person's knowledge of his right
to refuse consent to a search is merely one factor, not a prerequisite
and not determinative of the presence of voluntary consent.5 2 The
Court noted that it was leaving for another day the question of
whether consent could be voluntary if the individual agreeing to the
search was in custody.53
40. Id. at 220.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 220-21.
43. Id. at 220.
44. See id. at 219 (discussing the defendant's motion to suppress the checks).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 220-21.
47. Id. at 221.
48. Id. at 221-22.
49. Id. at 222.
50. Id. at 248-49.
51. Id. at 227.
52. Id. at 249.
53. Id. at 247.
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In reaching its decision, the Court weighed the legitimate need
for police "quick-look" searches5 4 against the risk of police coercion
54. To my knowledge, no academic articles have used this moniker to describe
cursory, warrantless searches of cars or premises, but the phrase seems to be emerging as
part of the nomenclature of appellate courts and seems to be a regular part of police
jargon. See, e.g., United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding
consent after a police officer "asked if he could take 'a quick look around' "); United
States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing whether defendant's
consent to a "quick look" search constituted informed consent, given the off-hand nature
of such a search). The phrase "quick look" appears fairly consistently as part of police
requests for consent to a search. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
2000) (finding no consent after an officer asked, "[y]ou wouldn't mind if I take a quick
look, would you?"). Courts must then analyze the scope of the authorized search when a
suspect acquiesces to such verbiage. See Ramstad, 308 F.3d at 1146-47. The phrase "quick
look" semantically suggests something like a plain view/plain touch search, but some
courts hold that the scope is the same as for a full search, including the opening of closed
containers. See, e.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the officer's search was excessively intrusive because the officer's statement that he
just wanted to take a "quick look inside the vehicle" limited the subject's consent to the
interior of the vehicle and did not extend to the trunk).
Courts have often upheld searches as constitutional based on their "quick look"
nature. See United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 2008) (contrasting "consent
for [a] quick look around the room"-allowing officers only to perform a "cursory
sweep"-with "authoriz[ation for] a full search"); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 720
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that because the officer "limited the remainder of the search to a
quick look into the second bedroom," the entry and search were lawful); United States v.
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that consent to a "quick
look" constitutes "general consent to search"); United States v. Porter, 49 F. App'x 438,
440-43 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that an officer's request for permission to take a "quick
look" during a roadside vehicle search did not limit authorized scope of subsequent search
to plain view); Ramstad, 308 F.3d at 1146-47 (holding that consent to let an officer take a
"quick look" around motor home authorized a search of closed containers as well); United
States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 845-46 (8th Cir. 2001) (consent to "quick look through" the
car during roadside traffic stop did not prohibit the use of a drug-detection dog); Montilla,
928 F.2d at 587 (officers asked to take a "quick look" at the defendant's bags, and
acquiescence constituted consent for complete search, not a mere plain view search);
United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 789 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Since the search at sea was
restricted to a quick look for weapons and other persons, it was clearly an investigatory
stop."); United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 841-842 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a
"quick look" by an officer through house window was justified by tip and did not require
warrant); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The normal reaction
in such a situation would be for the officers to move quickly into the room.., and take a
quick look for the third member of the robbery gang...."); United States v. Kee Ming
Hsu, 424 F.2d 1286, 1289 (2d Cir. 1970) ("There was no general ransacking or rummaging
about in the apartment as a whole although [the officer] took a quick look around to see if
a fugitive from justice ... might possibly be in the apartment."); State v. Washington, 898
N.E.2d 1200, 1207 (Ind. 2008) (upholding the search of a glove box after officer asked if he
could "take a quick look" inside the car).
For examples where courts distinguish "quick look" searches from full searches in
the context of consent, see People v. Bernstein, 890 N.E.2d 1225, 1231-32 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008) (holding that a seven-minute search was "impermissibly prolonged" after police
only requested permission for a "quick look" during roadside stop) and State v. Brown,
2012] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES
or manipulation in obtaining consent.55 The Court concluded that
there was nothing constitutionally suspect in a person voluntarily
consenting to a search.56
The Court distinguished the circumstances of Bustamonte's
consent from other similar cases with stricter standards for waiver of
constitutional rights.57 Bustamonte's situation was not inherently
coercive; he did not need a formal warning or informed consent to
protect his privilege against self-incrimination, a protection
indispensable to a fair trial.58 More important to the Court's rationale,
however, were two other concepts: the distinct purposes underlying
different Amendments in the Bill of Rights, and a stark realism about
the nature of nightly police patrols. Regarding the former, the Court
drew a largc (and rather new) distinction between the Fourth
Amendment, which limits police searches and protects the general
right to be undisturbed by police, and the fair trial right that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments safeguard so meticulously.59 Trial-related
rights necessitate more formalized, almost ceremonial waiver in order
to preserve the integrity of the justice system. Privacy rights, in
contrast, are more personal and subjective, subject to everyday
informal waivers as people publicize their own interests, activities,
and associations.6" Informal acquiescence is therefore acceptable in
Fourth Amendment contexts, where it would not be in Fifth or Sixth
Amendment contexts. Miranda warnings pertain to trials, as
confessions are inherently testimonial.61 Agreeing to open the car
trunk to reassure the patrol police that no crime is afoot is more
distant from the courtroom; such rights are more flexible, less
tangible, and less sacrosanct. A search that proceeds upon a request
294 S.W.3d 553, 564 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that consent to a "quick look" in the car during
roadside stop limited the scope to a plain view/plain touch search).
55. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227-28.
56. See id. at 243 (reasoning that "it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability
in the apprehension of criminals" (citation and internal quotations omitted)).
57. See id. at 235 (discussing the idea that consent is arguably a "waiver" of a person's
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment). Johnson v. Zerbst requires the
State to prove the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" for a
waiver to be valid. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
58. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 240 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966))
(noting that the "inherently coercive" situation in Miranda involved a police interrogation
of a person in custody).
59. See id. at 236-42.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 240-43.
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by police and consent by the individual is an "informal, unstructured
context.
6 2
The Bustamonte decision was controversial within the Court,
garnering two concurring opinions and three separate dissents,
verging on the antiquated seriatum-decision format63 as seven of the
nine justices registered views outside the plurality opinion. The
reaction in the academic literature was almost uniformly negative.'M
Much of the criticism expressed skepticism about the voluntariness of
consent in most police encounters, taking the position that most
people assume they are not truly free to refuse a search.65
The more sophisticated critiques drew upon psychological and
sociological research.66 For example, psychologist Dorothy Kagehiro
conducted extensive experiments on a broad pool of subjects to assess
the voluntariness of their "consent" to various types of requests and
demands. 67 By varying the differences in presentation and language
throughout the experiments, Kagehiro determined that the outcome
of a search request depends largely on the style of the request and the
perceived depth of the invasion.68 Yet all of the request forms met a
legal standard for voluntariness. 69 Kagehiro's research indicates that
the reception of the request directly relates to its presentation;7 ° even
62. Id. at 245.
63. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1187, 1223-25, 1230 (2007) (discussing how the United States Supreme Court originally
delivered opinions seriatim, one after the other).
64. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, Consent as a Bar to Fourth Amendment Scope-A
Critique of Common Theory, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 443-465 (1980); Arnold H.
Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 535,
554 (2002); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,
220-21 (2001); Joseph G. Casaccio, Note, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent
Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 846, 849-50 (1987) (arguing that
police have incentives to seek consent for searches after conducting some initial illegal
investigation, so that the suspect will feel that refusing consent is hopeless); Rebecca A.
Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving Content to the Concept of Free and Voluntary
Consent, 77 VA. L. REV. 183, 208 (1991) (arguing that true voluntariness "requires that a
suspect knows he has the power not to consent and understands the benefits and
drawbacks of his decision").
65. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 64, at 208.
66. For an excellent survey, see Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 165-97 (2002).
67. Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1
PSYCHOL. SCI. 187, 188-89 (1990).
68. See id. at 189. The request for consent to search came in the form of either an
interrogative or a declarative and could be specific or non-specific. The experiment
created further control variables by making the respondent either a consenter or a mere
observer.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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seemingly active consent to a search may be involuntary due to social
pressures and a mistaken understanding of police authority.71 This
creates a significant problem when juxtaposed with the finding from
Bustamonte declaring that voluntariness of consent merely requires
an absence of governmental coercion.72
Nevertheless, the Court's decisions in the years after Bustamonte
have been consistent; no Supreme Court decision since Bustamonte
has held that a defendant's consent to a search was involuntary.
73
Three years after Bustamonte, the Court extended the doctrine to
scenarios where the suspect was already in custody when the police
ask for consent to a search-again finding, in United States v.
Watson,74 that the defendant's consent had been voluntary. 75 The
uncertainty that led the Court to entertain the case lay partly in the
fact that there had been no arrest warrant, somewhat inexcusable
given the sting operation involved, but also because there was no
indication that police coerced Watson to give consent apart from
having him under arrest in public. 76 The Court did consider the
absence of proof that Watson knew he could withhold his consent,
but only as a factor. 77 Also relevant for the present subject is the
Court's heavy reliance on the federal code in resolving that a warrant
was unnecessary for the arrest. 7 The Court strongly hinted that
separation of powers, that is, deference to the Congress, colored its
analysis of the Fourth Amendment issue in this case. "Because there
is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of
Congress, especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable,' [o]bviously
the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized
by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore
71. See id.
72. See id. at 188 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
73. Before Bustamonte, the Court found consent to be involuntary or at least
"coerced" in a single case where police lied to an elderly woman, saying they had a search
warrant and that she could not refuse consent, when in fact they had no such warrant. See
North Carolina v. Bumper, 391 U.S 543,550 (1968).
74. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
75. Id. at 413. Watson consented to a search of his car, but later claimed the search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the police did not tell him he could
withhold consent. Id.
76. See id. at 414, 424-25. The police did not use an "overt act" or "threat of force[,]"
or even make promises with "subtle... coercion." Id.
77. See id. at 424. The police gave Watson Miranda warnings and told him that items
found in his car could be used against him. Id.
78. See id. at 415-17.
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unconstitutional. '"7 9 The decision in Watson was 6-2 (Justice Stevens
took no part in the case).,s
The Court has recently placed a limit on split consent-situations
where one co-tenant agrees to a search, while the other, being
present, refuses to give consent to search the same premises. In
Georgia v. Randolph," the Court held 5-4 that a husband, who was a
co-owner of the home and was present when the police requested
permission to search, could effectively refuse the search, even though
his estranged wife was simultaneously agreeing to the search.82
The most recent discussion of Bustamonte by the Supreme Court
came in 2011 in Kentucky v. King. 3 This was not a consent-to-search
case, but rather a case about the "exigent circumstances" exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for entering a home.
Police were knocking on the door of a home and, while announcing
their presence, they could hear suspects destroying evidence inside.84
In response, they forced their way in and found narcotics in plain
view.85 The Kentucky Supreme Court had held that the exigent
circumstances exception was inapplicable if the police in any way
caused the exigency, that is, if the suspects were destroying evidence
because of the police announcing their presence.86 The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, holding that it was
constitutionally irrelevant whether the police created the exigency, so
long as the officers at least attempted to obtain consent.87 Bustamonte
came into the case as part of the rationale for encouraging police to
ask for permission to search a home in most cases instead of obtaining
a warrant,8 8 but the Court's reasoning significantly recasts the import
of Bustamonte:
There are many entirely proper reasons why police may not
want to seek a search warrant as soon as the bare minimum of
evidence needed to establish probable cause is
acquired .... First, the police may wish to speak with the
occupants of a dwelling before deciding whether it is
79. Id. at 416 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
80. See id. at 425.
81. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
82. See id. at 103-04.
83. 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
84. Id. at 1854.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1855.
87. See id. at 1863.
88. See id. at 1860.
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worthwhile to seek authorization for a search. They may think
that a short and simple conversation may obviate the need to
apply for and execute a warrant. Second, the police may want
to ask an occupant of the premises for consent to search
because doing so is simpler, faster, and less burdensome than
applying for a warrant. A consensual search also "may result in
considerably less inconvenience" and embarrassment to the
occupants than a search conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Third, law enforcement officers may wish to obtain more
evidence before submitting what might otherwise be considered
a marginal warrant application.89
This marks a shift, for better or worse. Bustamonte was originally
a permissive rule, but King turns it into the preferred protocol for
police by holding that the attempt to obtain consent outweighs or
negates the fact that the police created the exigency. Rather than
merely allowing police to obtain consent instead of seeking a warrant,
the Court has extended the reach of its reasons in Bustamonte to
other areas of Fourth Amendment law, encouraging police to proceed
by asking permission to search as a first recourse and seeking a
warrant only when the party will not consent. The underlying
assumption seems to be that Bustamonte protects the citizenry in two
ways-not only does it protect from coercion to obtain consent, but
also from investigatory overkill in cases of false leads and dead ends,
which can unduly harass the innocent who have no involvement in the
crime. Ironically, Bustamonte has become its own kind of
prophylactic rule.
B. Enactment in North Carolina
North Carolina historically has been ahead of the curve in the
area of criminal procedure and civil liberties. The state legislature
enacted90 an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained without a
warrant ten years before the Supreme Court adopted the same rule
for states in Mapp v. Ohio.9 In 1970, the Criminal Code Commission
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. See Barry Nakell, Proposed Revisions to North Carolina's Search and Seizure Law,
52 N.C. L. REv. 277,277 (1974) (citing Act of Apr. 9, 1951, ch. 644, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws
601 (amending section 15-27 of the North Carolina General Statutes to exclude evidence
obtained without a warrant in situations where a warrant would be required)); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (repealed 1973).
91. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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submitted a proposed overhaul to modernize the state's Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 92
The Commission's proposal included a section about police
obtaining consent for searches, anticipating the Supreme Court's
decision in Bustamonte by several months.93 Previous decisions by
North Carolina's own appellate courts had already staked out most of
the position that the legislature now codified. The bottom line of both
the Commission's proposal and Bustamonte is that voluntary consent
to a search eliminates any Fourth or Fifth Amendment concerns, and
evidence resulting from the search is admissible at trial. The
legislature's enactment, codified at sections 15A-221 through -222 of
the North Carolina General Statutes, essentially mirrors the Supreme
Court's holding that year in Bustamonte.
An important alteration, however, distinguished the
Commission's proposal from both the enacted statute and the
Bustamonte decision. The proposal included a requirement of
informed consent as part of voluntariness-the police would have to
inform a suspect of her right to refuse a search in order for the
"consent" to be valid.94 The Supreme Court in Bustamonte
specifically declined to mandate this Miranda-like warning, stating
explicitly that it seemed unworkable in the daily chaos of crime
fighting.95 The Commission's proposal was, it seems, ahead of its
time-four or five other states eventually adopted the warning rule
(requiring informed consent in most cases),96 and it appears that
North Carolina police, of their own accord, began routinely using
written consent forms with the warning sometime in the late 1970s.97
92. See CRIMINAL CODE COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM & REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE REPORT];
see also Nakell, supra note 90, at 277.
93. Bustamonte was decided May of 1973. See 412 U.S. 218, 218 (1973). The Criminal
Code Commission submitted its report in January of the same year. See LEGISLATIVE
REPORT, supra note 92.
94. See Nakell, supra note 90, at 315-16; LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 92, at 14.
95. See infra Part II.A.
96. See infra Part LD.
97. The first North Carolina case to mention this practice is State v. Sheppard, 42 N.C.
App. 125, 128, 256 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1979) (defendant refused to sign consent forms on two
occasions), followed by State v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669, 670, 273 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1981), and
State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 157, 293 S.E.2d 569, 575 (1982). More recent cases show the
extent to which a signed consent form ends the judicial inquiry. See, e.g., State v.
McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 375-77, 407 S.E.2d 200, 207-08 (1991) (stating that police
sometimes use a written consent to search form, which courts consider as part of the
totality of the circumstances for establishing voluntariness-note that the person who
signed the form was mildly retarded); State v. Moore, 316 N.C. 328, 332-33, 341 S.E.2d
733, 736-37 (1986) (stating that police regularly use a written consent to search form,
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Nevertheless, the verbiage that the North Carolina legislature
adopted in 1973 omitted the proposal's warning requirement, with no
explanation in the legislative history for this last-minute change.
Section 15A-222 of the North Carolina General Statutes as codified
does not include the warning requirement, which the proposal
interposed as a subsection (b) in section 15A-222.98 North Carolina
remains the only state with a statutory definition of "consent"
pertaining to police searches,99 but this definition lacks the element of
"informed" consent."°
The Commission explains in its commentary: "There are
indications that the Burger Court will moderate some of the
exclusionary rules, and this section is designed not to freeze North
Carolina's statutory law into patterns set solely by current case
law."1 °1 In other words, most sections of the proposal contained
enough ambiguity to allow it to remain tethered to the Supreme
Court's evolving jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rules. The
Commentary adds that particular concern centered on the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine; the proposal left gaps where the American
Law Institute's earlier generic proposal was specific to avoid conflicts
with the Supreme Court on the ambit of the poisonous tree
concept. 10 2 The consent section10 3 was an exception, as it delineated
an explicit requirement that the Supreme Court would soon
disavow.1°4
For better or worse, the deletion of the warning requirement in
the final enactment allowed the North Carolina statute to track the
Supreme Court's consistent holdings on this point over the last four
decades.0 5 It is possible that the Court could someday move toward
which courts consider as part of the totality of the circumstances for establishing
voluntariness); State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 310, 612 S.E.2d 420, 427 (2005)
(stating that police sometimes use a written "consent to search form[,]" which courts
consider as part of the totality of the circumstances for establishing voluntariness (internal
citation and quotations omitted)). At the same time, there is some indication that North
Carolina police do not use written consent forms consistently. See, e.g., State v. Houston,
169 N.C. App. 367, 369, 610 S.E.2d 777, 779 (2005) (also noting that defendant was already
arrested when he gave consent, but not yet Mirandized).
98. LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 92, at 14.
99. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 404.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-221 to -222 (2011).
101. LEGISLATIVE REPORT, supra note 92, at 238.
102. Id. at 238-39.
103. See id. at 14.
104. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
105. The rule that the North Carolina legislature codified at sections 15A-221 to -222
generally reflected pre-existing case law from the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
indicating that North Carolina's high court had anticipated the Supreme Court's decision
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requiring informed consent if the partisan balance on the Court
shifted dramatically to the left. In the meantime, the Court will
probably leave the current consent rule intact, placing minimal
restraints on police.
Section 15A-221(b) defines consent as a statement made to an
officer, and the legislature probably intended this to mean a written
or oral statement, as opposed to tacit acquiescence." 6  The
Commentary of the Code Commission Report is silent in regards to
this. Nevertheless, within a few months of the statute's passage, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that silently submitting to a
search constituted consent under the statute.10 7
C. Judicial Gloss in North Carolina
It seems appropriate to mention how North Carolina judges have
handled this statute, partly for the sake of completeness in this
discussion, and partly because it is inherently interesting to see how
judges interpret legislation, which, in turn, was an attempt to codify a
judicial holding. The two most recent North Carolina Supreme Court
cases to interpret North Carolina's codified consent statute are
in Bustamonte by several years. See, e.g., State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 578-79, 180 S.E.2d
755, 767 (1971) ("[C]onsent of the owner must be freely and intelligently given, without
coercion, duress or fraud, and the burden is upon the state to prove that it was so, the
presumption being against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. However, the
warnings required by Miranda, in order to make competent a confession made in custody,
need not be given by officers before obtaining the consent of the owner to a search of his
premises." (citations omitted)); State v. Craddock, 272 N.C. 160, 169, 158 S.E.2d 25, 31-32
(1967) ("Where the owner or person in charge of an automobile voluntarily consents to
the search, he cannot be heard to complain that his constitutional and statutory rights
were violated."). One significant point, however, on which sections 15A-221 and 15A-222
broke from state court precedents was on the issue of wives granting valid consent to
search of the family home. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina later explained in
State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 283, 443 S.E.2d 68, 75 (1994), prior to the 1973 legislation,
married women in North Carolina lacked legal authority to consent to a search of their
homes. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 613, 213 S.E.2d 214, 220-21 (1975), vacated
in part by Woods v. N.C., 428 U.S. 903 (1976), overruled by Worsley, 336 N.C. at 283, 443
S.E.2d at 76; State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391,178 S.E.2d 65 (1970), overruled by Worsley, 336
N.C. at 283, 443 S.E.2d at 76 (recognizing the continuing validity of Hall); State v. Hall,
264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965), overruled by Worsley, 336 N.C. at 283, 443 S.E.2d at
76 (wife did not have the authority to consent to a search of the home and therefore stolen
property recovered during the search was inadmissible against the husband at trial). In
Worsley, however, the court explained: "These cases have been effectively overruled on
this point, however, by the enactment of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-221, -222 .... The statute places
no express restriction on the authority of a wife to consent to a search of the premises she
shares with her husband." Worsley, 336 N.C. at 283, 443 S.E.2d at 75.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-221(b) (2011).
107. See State v. Allen, 194 S.E.2d 9, 16, 282 N.C. 503, 511-13 (1973). For commentary,
see Harrison, supra note 5, at 425.
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illustrative of its import. The most recent, State v. Steen,' °8 was an
appeal from a murder conviction involving many grounds."°9 Two
points of Steen's appeal dealt directly with whether he gave voluntary
consent to a police search-his consent to a search of his person
during his first police encounter, and his subsequent consent to a
search of his clothing worn on the day of a crime. 110 The case began
with a police officer responding to a call from a woman concerned
that her eighty-year-old neighbor's window had been broken."' Upon
arrival, the officer found the body of the elderly woman, Virginia
Frost, who had been the victim of a rape-murder. 2 Later that day,
another officer responded to a call about a man (Steen) weaving and
driving recklessly on a bicycle not far from Mrs. Frost's residence. 3
When the police officers stopped the meandering rider, they
discovered that his face was injured, that he had what looked like
dried blood on his face, and that he smelled of alcohol."' Steen
consented to a search of his person, which yielded a driver's license
and numerous credit cards in another man's name, a crack pipe, and a
marijuana pipe.115 The officers arrested him for credit card theft and
possession of drug paraphernalia and sent the arresting information
to the detectives working the Frost homicide case." 6 A week later,
Steen also gave written consent for the police to search the clothes he
was wearing at the time of his arrest." 7 Later that month, police
arrested Steen for the murder of Mrs. Frost. 11' Steen sought to
suppress the evidence that the police obtained when they stopped him
on his bicycle," 9  arguing that under the "totality of the
circumstances" the police did not have reasonable articulable
suspicion that he was engaged in any criminal activity.12 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that, because the officers
stopped the defendant for his "erratic and reckless manner" while
driving his bicycle, the stop itself was justified.' As to whether the
108. 352 N.C. 227, 536 S.E.2d 1 (2000).
109. See id. at 234, 536 S.E.2d at 6-7.
110. See id. at 236, 536 S.E.2d at 7-9.
111. Id. at 235, 536 S.E.2d at 6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 236, 536 S.E.2d at 6.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 236, 536 S.E.2d at 7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 236, 536 S.E.2d at 7-8.
120. Id. at 237, 536 S.E.2d at 8.
121. Id. at 239, 536 S.E.2d at 8.
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search was voluntary, the court quoted the controlling statute that
"consent to a search requires a voluntary statement to the officer
giving the officer permission to make a search." 122 The court also
quoted the Bustamonte language regarding the totality of the
circumstances. 123 The court concluded that his consent was voluntary
and affirmed his conviction; 24 in other words, the North Carolina
courts seem to be using Bustamonte to interpret their own state's
statute, treating the two as virtually interchangeable.
Two years earlier, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reached
a very different conclusion in State v. Pearson.1 25 Pearson was
convicted of cocaine trafficking, possession with intent to sell, and
felonious possession of a controlled substance.1 2 6 On the day of his
arrest, he had been driving below the speed limit and drifting in and
out of his lane, prompting a routine traffic stop. 127 The officer said he
smelled a hint of alcohol, but not enough to presume that the driver
was impaired; the conversation with Pearson and his fianc6 (a
passenger in the car) was polite.128 Pearson consented to a search and
signed a consent form. 129 Another officer then arrived on the scene
for assistance, and the first officer asked the second to frisk the
defendant while the first searched the vehicle. 3° The frisk turned up
cocaine and marijuana.' Pearson sought to suppress the contraband
evidence from the search of his person, but the trial court noted that
he signed the consent form and did not object to the officers
searching him or his vehicle and admitted the evidence. 3 2 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed133 based on the lack of
probable cause for the search.'34 The Court added that the signed
consent form only applied to the defendant's vehicle and not his
person."5 The officers testified that standard police procedure
included a frisk of every person whose car they search, 3 6 but the
122. Id. at 239-40, 536 S.E.2d at 9 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-221(b) (2011)).
123. Id. at 240, 536 S.E.2d at 9.
124. Id.
125. 348 N.C. 272, 273, 498 S.E.2d 599, 599 (1998).
126. Id. at 274, 498 S.E.2d at 599.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 274, 498 S.E.2d at 599, 601.
129. Id. at 274, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
136. Id. at 274, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
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Court held that "there must be a clear and unequivocal consent
before a defendant can waive his constitutional rights."'37 Somewhat
ironically, the documentation of the defendant's consent turned out
to work in the defendant's favor, as its specific delineation of the
search to which he consented placed the discovered contraband
outside the scope of the consent. 3 s
D. Informed Consent in Other States
It is worth noting that a few other states have adopted, either
legislatively or judicially, the augmented rule of consent for police
searches, requiring police to inform the potential suspect of her right
to decline a search. The section makes a quick survey of the few states
with the rule that the North Carolina Criminal Code Commission
proposed but that the legislature dropped from the final enacted bill.
The main importance of these examples for the present
discussion is that they illustrate that the issue of legislative definitions
of rights in the search context is larger than North Carolina's statute.
Other states have begun codifying the parameters of various criminal
procedure rights, and all present potential questions of the
appropriate level of judicial deference. These examples all pertain to
consent-the starting point of this discussion-but state variations on
other points of law present similar questions of judicial deference.
The other approaches surveyed here also arguably belie the
Supreme Court's assertion in Bustamonte that informed consent
would be unworkable as a police patrol protocol. States are
experimenting in this area, as they are in other spheres of criminal
procedure, with apparent success. There is no indication that the new
approach (which the Court rejected in Bustamonte) is creating an
unworkable situation for police in these states. Of course, a handful
137. Id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
138. Id. Another recent case, State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 653 S.E.2d 414 (2007), is
marginally relevant to the present discussion, even though the consent statute itself did not
appear in the decision. The defendant consented to a pat-down search for drugs during a
routine patrol stop, but the officer proceeded to pull open the waistband of Stone's
sweatpants and underwear to peer in with a flashlight, discovering a bottle of contraband
there before Stone could articulate an objection to this heightened intrusion. Id. at 52, 653
S.E.2d at 417. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "a reasonable person in
defendant's circumstances would not have understood that his general consent to search
included allowing the law enforcement officer to pull his pants and underwear away from
his body and shine a flashlight on his genitals." Id. at 56, 653 S.E.2d at 418-19. The
relevance of this case for the present discussion is that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina appears to be supplementing the consent statute with its own common law, which
could eventually function as a judicial gloss on the statute itself.
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of states may not compel the Court to change immediately, although
the Supreme Court sometimes cites a developing "trend" in state
legislatures as a justification for reversing itself, even when the
innovators are far fewer than those adhering to tradition. 3 9 Even
though Bustamonte is likely to remain intact for the time being, the
discussion would be incomplete without noting these relevant
developments in other states.
1. West Virginia
In 2010, West Virginia enacted a law that outlines the
requirements that a law enforcement officer must follow in order to
conduct a proper search during a traffic stop. 4 ' While probable cause
is of course required, the West Virginia legislature also added consent
as a requirement. 4' The manner in which the officer obtains consent
can take one of two forms: oral consent evidenced by an audio
recording or written consent. 42 Written consent must be on a form
that complies with the statute143: "A statement that the operator of
the motor vehicle fully understands that he or she may refuse to give
the law-enforcement officer consent to search the motor vehicle."'"
The form must also contain a statement that the driver has given
consent "freely and voluntarily" and may revoke her consent at any
time during the search. 45 In cases of oral consent, the audio recording
must include a statement that the driver understands that he or she
may refuse consent. 46
The West Virginia statute provides two exceptions to the consent
requirements. First, when an officer has a "reasonable suspicion of
dangerousness to his or her safety," the officer need not record
consent at the time. 47 Second, and more significantly, "[a] finding by
a court that the operator of a motor vehicle voluntarily and verbally
consented to a search of the motor vehicle shall make the recordation
139. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559-60 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). A later subsection addresses this subject in more detail. See infra
Part III.C.
140. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1A-10 (LexisNexis 2010).
141. See id. § 62-1A-10(a)(2), (3).
142. See id.
143. See id. § 62-1A-10(a)(2).
144. Id. § 62-1A-11(b)(1).
145. See id. § 62-1A-11(b)(2), (3).
146. See id. § 62-1A-11(c)(1).
147. See id. § 62-1A-10(c).
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requirements of this section inapplicable.""14 This exception is
puzzling because it does not mention anything about the officer
informing the driver of his right to consent, and could defeat the
purpose of the rest of the statute, depending on how courts construe
this clause. As the statute took effect very recently (January 2011),
there have not yet been any legal challenges to shed light on this
exception.
An interesting difference between the West Virginia statute and
the North Carolina statute is that West Virginia requires consent
from the "operator" of the vehicle149 while North Carolina's statute
requires consent by the "registered owner" of the car or "by the
person in apparent control of its operation and contents at the time
the consent is given.' ' 150 This means that if the operator of the car was
not the owner, but the car's owner was in the vehicle and consented,
such consent would apparently be invalid in West Virginia, but would
be valid under the North Carolina law.
2. New Jersey
New Jersey's constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...."1 In
State v. Johnson,152 the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted this
constitutional provision to mean that when the State seeks to justify a
search based on consent, the State has the burden to show that the
search was voluntary.1 53 The court also held that an "essential
element" of voluntariness is "knowledge of the right to refuse
consent." 
154
In 2002, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed and extended
Johnson. 5 5 The court held that in order for an officer to search a
vehicle during a routine traffic stop there must be "an articulable
suspicion that the search will yield evidence of illegal activity.'
'1 56
148. Id. § 62-1A-10(e).
149. See id.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-222(2) (2011).
151. N.J. CONST. art. I, 7.
152. 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975).
153. See id. at 68.
154. Id.
155. See State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2002).
156. Id. at 912.
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3. Washington
A 1998 Washington Supreme Court ruling on informed consent
cited New Jersey's State v. Johnson and declared "knock and talk"
procedures of the police in performing home searches to be
coercive."' The court adopted a rule that when police conduct a
"knock and talk" for the purpose of obtaining consent to search a
home, they must inform the person that he or she can refuse to
consent or limit the scope of the house allowed to be searched and
also revoke consent at any time during the search.'58
4. Arkansas
Arkansas has a provision in its Rules of Criminal Procedure
allowing a law enforcement officer to conduct searches and seizures
without a warrant if consent is given. 159 The provision further specifies
that the State must bear the burden of proof by "clear and positive
evidence" that the consent was given freely and voluntarily and that
there was no actual or implied coercion or duress. 6 Arkansas
furthers the protections against unlawful searches and seizures when
it comes to one's dwelling: in order for a search of a dwelling to be
valid, the person giving consent must have received notice of his right
to refuse. 161 Arkansas appears to be the only state that distinguishes
between searches of cars and homes regarding consent-for vehicles,
the person registered as its owner or in apparent control of its
operation or contents at the time of the search must give consent. 162
In contrast, for premises searches, consent can come from a person
who is "apparently entitled" to give or withhold consent-by
ownership or otherwise. 16' A third tier of consent analysis applies for
searches of the person; searches of children under fourteen must be
accomplished by a parent's consent in addition to the child's
consent.164
A person giving consent to a search in Arkansas may also limit
the scope of their consent, and if they do so, then the search may not
157. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998).
158. See id.
159. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.1(a).
160. Id. 11.1(b).
161. See id. 11.1(c).
162. See id. 11.2(b). Note that this is almost identical language to the North Carolina
provision detailing who may give consent. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-222 (2011).
163. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.2(c).
164. See id. 11.2(a).
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exceed "in duration or physical scope" the limits of the consent. 16
Similar to some other states, 66 Arkansas also allows suspects to
revoke or limit consent after it is given. 167 A search must cease upon
the revocation of consent, but anything found before that time is
subject to lawful seizure."6
5. Mississippi
In Penick v. State,169 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
informed consent was necessary before a search could commence. 17
The officers in this case intercepted Penick as he deplaned at the
airport, suspecting him of drug possession, and asked him to follow
them to a private interrogation room where they conducted a strip
search and opened his luggage.' 7' The facts regarding what Penick
actually consented to were ambiguous. 172 Mississippi's state
constitutional provision regarding searches and seizures is nearly
identical to the Fourth Amendment, 173 but the court emphasized that
state courts have the final word on the meaning of their own
constitutions.174 Relying on a 1923 Mississippi case, 171 the court held
that the State has the burden of proving that the defendant knowingly
waived his rights when he consented to the search. 176 "[W]here an
accused neither consents to nor objects to the search, [it] does not
constitute a waiver."'177 The court elaborated by asking the question,
"in order for there to be a valid waiver of the Constitutional right
against an illegal search, is it necessary that the person searched be
aware of his right under the law to refuse?"'' 78 The court answered
"yes" and established that the "best way" for the State to prove that a
defendant had knowledge of his right to refuse was for the officer to
165. Id. 11.3.
166. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1A-11(3) (Lexis Nexis 2010); see also State v.
Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998).
167. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.5.
168. See id. For more discussion of consent rules in Arkansas, see Stanley Adelman,
Towards an Independent State Constitutional Jurisprudence Il-Arkansas Supreme Court
Rules State Constitution Requires Warning Prior to "Knock and Talk" Searches, 2004 ARK.
L. NOTES 3, 5-8 (2004).
169. 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983).
170. See id. at 558.
171. Id. at 547-48.
172. See id. at 548.
173. See id. at 549.
174. Id. at 551-52.
175. See Smith v. State, 98 So. 344 (Miss. 1923).
176. See Penick, 440 So. 2d at 551.
177. Id. at 559.
178. Id. at 550.
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actually tell him. 179 Finally, the court established that there must have
been "clear evidence" that the defendant had knowledge of his right
to refuse. 8°
As explained at the beginning of this subsection, these examples
are relevant for the ensuing discussion because they illustrate how
state approaches can vary even when the issues have federal
constitutional dimensions. A court reviewing the statute and police
action predicated upon it would have to acknowledge in its analysis
the presence of relevant legislation as opposed to other forms of state
action or rulemaking. This degree of variation on a simple point like
consent to police searches suggests the ubiquity of this deference-to-
legislatures issue across many areas of law. More narrowly, these
other states arguably demonstrate that informed consent is, in fact,
workable both for the police conducting investigations and for the
courts determining the voluntariness of consent after the fact. The
fact that states are taking varying approaches to this and other issues
raises the question addressed more fully in the next Part-the degree
of deference that the Court should give to state legislatures or courts
on criminal procedure.
II. VARYING LEVELS OF DEFERENCE
A state statute that defines some essential terms for analyzing
Fourth Amendment rights, as the North Carolina consent statute
does, could face a Supreme Court challenge at some point if, for
example, the Court's jurisprudence moves to a position of requiring
more protections than the statute seems to offer. Such a challenge
would present a complex problem touching on issues of federalism,
incorporation, and separation of powers.
Conventional wisdom would presume that if the Court raised the
standard for valid consent, perhaps by requiring Miranda-like
warnings of the suspect's right to refuse a warrantless search, then this
would invalidate North Carolina's statute, as it falls short of such a
requirement. Yet the literature recently has largely ignored the role
that separation of powers concerns play in the Court's decisions about
what procedural safeguards to impose on the states. The Court has
never explicitly acknowledged that its criminal procedure decisions
rest partly on whether the challenged state action is legislative versus
executive, but there are examples where this issue colors the Court's
analysis. Separation of powers has never made it onto one of the
179. See id.
180. See id.
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Court's lists for "totality of the circumstances" factors, but the Court
pays attention-and some amount of deference-to statutes when
they are relevant to the case, as will be shown.
By "varying levels of deference," this Article means simply that
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, are more
deferential to state legislatures than to state and local police forces or
other enforcement agencies. The constitutional review conducted by
a court is different-more deferential-when there is legislative
action involved rather than mere police protocol.
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Statutes in Fourth Amendment
Cases
As mentioned in the Introduction, deference does not necessarily
determine the outcome of the case. Even so, it still operates as one
factor, even if it is not the sole factor or the most important factor; it
is a matter of incremental deference. Decisions about consent and
searches do not depend solely on the text of the Fourth Amendment
or even the entrenched jurisprudence surrounding the amendment.
These factors, while critical, work in conjunction with the question of
which branch is facing the constitutional challenge.
In United States v. Watson, for example, the Court relied partially
on the federal code in holding that a warrant was unnecessary for the
arrest.181 The decision suggests that separation of powers, that is,
deference to the legislature, colored the Court's analysis of the
Fourth Amendment issue in this case. "Because there is a 'strong
presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially
when it turns on what is 'reasonable,' 'obviously the Court should be
reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was
unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional.' "182
The Court also suggested, albeit in a footnote, that state statutes
could define circumstances under which no warrant is necessary for
an arrest. 83 Watson was also the first case in which the Supreme
Court held valid the consent given to a search after the defendant was
already in custody."
181. 423 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1976). Watson consented to a search of his car, but later
claimed the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the police did not tell
him he could withhold consent. Id. at 412-413.
182. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,585 (1948)).
183. See id. at 420 n.8.
184. See id. at 424-25; see also Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the
Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L.
REv. 277, 392 n.487 (1985) (citing Watson and indicating the deference given to Congress
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The Watson Court relied heavily upon an older case,'85 United
States v. Di Re, 8 6 which demonstrates an even stronger commitment
to separation of powers considerations. There, the Supreme Court
employed a two-step approach to assess the legality of a warrantless
arrest for federal crimes. First, it announced a policy of general
deference to federal statutes authorizing warrantless searches or
arrests, 187 but suggested that cases decided under these statutes create
no applicable precedent for those where no such statutory
authorization exists.'88 Second, the Court set forth a default rule for
analyzing the legality of arrests in the absence of a pertinent federal
statute: "[I]n absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the
state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its
validity."'89 Ultimately, the Supreme Court looked to the New York
state statute to determine whether the arrest was constitutionally
valid and concluded that the federal agents had failed to conform to
state law in making this (warrantless) misdemeanor arrest. 90 The
Court overturned the federal conviction based on the state statute, to
which it deferred. 191
More ambiguous for the point asserted here is the Court's
holding in Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
Francisco,'92 which involved a municipal code authorizing local
building inspectors to conduct regular warrantless searches of
residential apartments, and to prosecute tenants who refused
access.193 Camara's relevance for the present discussion is unclear
in the area of criminal procedure); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and
Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1764 (2000) (noting that the court in Watson
was reiterating the common law rule allowing warrantless felony arrests based on probable
cause).
185. See, e.g., 423 U.S. at 416.
186. 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Police found Di Re with hundreds of counterfeit wartime-
ration vouchers hidden on his person, and he faced charges under the relevant federal
statute. Id. at 582.
187. See id. at 585.
188. See id. The federal prosecutors in Di Re argued that the Court's Prohibition-Era
ruling in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) should create a universal automobile
exception for warrants. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 584. The Court distinguished Carroll on the
grounds that it involved an explicit federal statutory authorization for warrantless searches
to enforce Prohibition, making its holding inapplicable to searches outside the purview of
that statute. See id. at 584-85. It also distinguished Carroll factually, as Di Re did not
involve searching a car, but rather the occupant of a car. See id. at 585-86.
189. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
190. See id at 591-92.
191. See id. at 595.
192. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
193. See id. at 526. At issue in Camara was section 503 of the San Francisco Municipal
Housing Code, which simply stated: "Authorized employees of the City departments or
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partly because administrative search cases are a special category with
distinct rules and partly because the Court was unclear about
invalidating the local law. The Court disapproved of the municipal
inspection program as applied and made no mention of its legislative
pedigree, if it had any. 194 The holding explicitly decreed that
legislative enactments could not absolutely abrogate the need for
warrants before entering a home: "We simply cannot say that the
protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this
context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for
individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be
invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty." '95 Commentators since
Camara have mistakenly stated that the Court invalidated or struck
down the law at issue; 19 6 in reality, the Court tacitly skirted the
ordinance itself and confined its reversal to the actual criminal
conviction for refusing the warrantless search. 97 In fact, the Court
concluded at the end of the opinion that legislatures can authorize
dragnet administrative inspections as long as citizens can, in the rare
situations when they would, demand a warrant before consenting to a
search; probable cause for the warrant can be automatic if legislation
so authorizes.1 98 Thus, the Court on the one hand stated that
legislatures do not have absolute authority to dispense with
constitutional warrant requirements (at least for searches of
dwellings, which was the issue in Camara), but on the other hand,
City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon
presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any
building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code." Id.
194. See id. at 534. It is unclear whether the Housing Code at issue in Camara was
adopted legislatively by a city council vote, by decision of a local official, or by an
executive committee.
195. Id. at 533.
196. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1446 n.28 (1968); Christopher Slobogin,
Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 132 (2010); The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 263 (1971); Michael F. Kiely, Note, Illinois v. Krull:
When Has a Legislature Wholly Abandoned Its Responsibility to Enact Constitutional
Laws?, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 411, 444 (1993).
197. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 540.
198. See id. at 538 (" '[P]robable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards ... may be based upon the
passage of time (or] the nature of the building .... ).
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stated that legislatures can declare automatic probable cause for
search warrants in certain circumstances. 199
A case that is harder to reconcile with Watson and Di Re is
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,2°° decided two years after Watson, in which
the Court invalidated warrantless searches (safety inspections) of
businesses by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). 21' The Court expressly held the relevant federal statute
unconstitutional insofar as it authorized inspections without
warrants.2° Yet even within the opinion, a number of features limit
the Court's holding and make it easier to reconcile with the proposal
here. First, the Court acknowledged that many other federal statutes
validly authorize warrantless searches by federal agencies; 2°3 but the
Court distinguished the OSHA statute from these based on its
universal applicability to all industries and lack of internal provisions
for obtaining judicial review of unreasonable inspections.2° In
addition, the Court noted: "The critical fact in this case is that entry
over Mr. Barlow's objection is being sought by a Government
agent.""05 This suggests that Marshall is no different from Camara in
allowing warrantless inspections as a default procedure, as long as
individuals can demand a warrant in the rare cases where they would
want to do so; and that in such cases warrants will issue under a very
relaxed probable cause standard, at least compared to criminal
investigations.
There is also some reason to think that Marshall is an outlier.216
The opinion never mentions the previous Watson case, which upheld
warrantless arrests by postal inspectors as authorized by federal
statute.0 7 Perhaps Watson seemed unrelated because its statutory
analysis pertained to warrantless arrests rather than searches, or
perhaps because the OSHA statute allowed for civil administrative
inspections while Watson was a criminal investigation.
199. See id. Camara applies to administrative searches or monitoring, which generally
receive different treatment from the courts than do criminal investigations. See South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (specifying that Camara applied to
warrants "outside the context of a criminal investigation").
200. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
201. See id. at 324-25.
202. See id. at 325.
203. See id. at 321.
204. See id. at 321-22.
205. Id. at 314.
206. Like Camara, the Marshall case applies to administrative searches, which
generally receive different treatment from the courts than do criminal investigations. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976).
207. Watson v. United States, 423 U.S. 411, 412-413,424-25 (1976).
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Professor Rosenkranz singles out Marshall for special criticism.2 °8
The Fourth Amendment analysis, he explains, should start with
asking who actually violated the Amendment in this case.20 9 The usual
answer would be that the agents of the executive branch committed
the violation by conducting an unreasonable search; this would be a
challenge to the statute "as-applied," rather than contending that
Congress violated the Fourth Amendment by enacting the statute.
210
Rosenkranz goes on to explicate:
[T]ext and structure strongly suggest that the Fourth
Amendment is concerned with executive and judicial actions
rather than legislative actions. The first clause of the
Amendment appears to prohibit the executive act of
unreasonable searching, not the act of authorizing
unreasonable searches .... And the second, Warrants Clause
of the Amendment, which is concerned with the authorizing of
searches, is directed not at Congress but at the Judiciary (and
perhaps at the executive branch). So unless a statute can itself
be considered a "warrant," it is not quite right to say, as the
Court did in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., that the "Act [of
Congress] is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize
inspections without warrant or its equivalent." The act of
Congress did not violate the Fourth Amendment; the act of the
President did.
To put the point another way, the text of the Fourth
Amendment does not follow the model of the First
Amendment. It does not say, for example, "Congress shall
make no law authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures."
If it did, then Congress would indeed be the constitutional
culprit. But as written, it seems that Congress might purport to
authorize a Fourth Amendment violation, but it cannot
actually commit a Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, the
Court generally seems to realize as much, which explains why
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. is the only case in the Court's history
that has purported to strike down an action (or "Act") of
Congress under the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, as Rosenkranz concludes, it would be a milestone for the
Supreme Court to strike down a law like North Carolina's consent
statute, even if it takes a disliking to the uninformed consent rule.
Marshall is the only case where the Court has ever explicitly struck
208. See Rosenkranz, Subjects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1239-41.
209. See id. at 1239.
210. See id. at 1239-40.
211. Id. at 1240-41.
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down a statute on Fourth Amendment grounds; even in Camara, as
noted above, the Court avoided declaring the ordinance itself invalid
and took pains to emphasize that it would take a deferential view to
legislation that provided even minimal safeguards for exceptional
cases.
Perhaps the best-known criminal procedure case striking down a
statute is Dickerson v. United States,212 in which the Supreme Court
invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute Congress intended to repeal
Miranda.213 Dickerson's charges all related to an armed bank heist,
and he confessed to the crime voluntarily at an FBI field station
without receiving Miranda warnings.214 Dickerson was not yet under
arrest at the time of his confession, but merely at the station for
questioning;21 nevertheless, stationhouse questioning is "custodial"
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that
the confession was admissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3501's standards for
"voluntary ' 216 actions, and arguably flouted its repudiation of
Miranda.217 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 3501 was
irreconcilable with Miranda, and that the latter was a constitutional
rule.2"' Dickerson is not completely on point, however, as the case
involved the privilege against self-incrimination, which the Court
explained in Bustamonte was far more sacrosanct and deserving of
judicial safeguarding than the right to decide whether to consent to a
search.
Moreover, stare decisis weighed heavily in the Court's analysis
and conclusion,2"9 making this a rather unique case; perhaps no
Supreme Court case was as well-known to the general population as
Miranda. The case presented an awkward (and incredibly rare)
scenario for the Court, where the issue on appeal did not have the
support of either party, but had been an aggressively independent
move by the Fourth Circuit to overthrow Miranda single-handedly.22 °
Even if the Court had been inclined to restrict Miranda or find some
212. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
213. See id. at 432.
214. See id.
215. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated, 530 U.S.
428.
216. Id. at 671.
217. See id. at 685-89.
218. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. 432, 444 (2000).
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; see also Yale Kamisar, Confessions,
Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 470 (1999) (detailing the
background of this move by the Fourth Circuit).
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way to reconcile it with § 3501, it was unlikely that it would do so over
the strident objections of the Department of Justice in this case, or do
anything that would encourage a renegade lower court in its judicial
activism.
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Dickerson.21 In it, he
argued that Miranda was a mistake from the beginning, a deviation
from all prior precedent.2 2 Of particular relevance for this discussion,
Scalia also maintained, with substantial support, that the Supreme
Court had a duty to defer to legislation except in cases where a
statute is directly "in opposition to the constitution. ' ' 223 Scalia lacked
the votes to prevail in Dickerson, but his dissent is an illustration of
the proposal made in this Article-that separation of powers should
be a consideration in criminal procedure analysis.
Former D.C. Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Starr has offered
two explanations for what he describes as the "unexpected" result in
Dickerson.22 4 The first is an institutionalist account: the majority made
a strategic decision to maintain the status quo and uphold the core of
a previous ruling that had "caught the public's attention and
imagination,"2 5 while fully preserving its ability to limit and
undermine Miranda through an ever-increasing list of exceptions and
caveats. 6 Secondly, Starr believes the Court viewed § 3501 as a
legislative fluke, the product of a semi-hysterical "transient popular
majority" in 1968,227 which was a close-race election year.2 8 Evincing
221. See Dickerson, 530 U.S at 444-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 447-50.
223. Id. at 446-47 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
224. See STARR, supra note 27, at 203.
225. Id. at 205.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 206.
228. See Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ.
L. REV. 195, 217-18 (2004) ("The college seemed to magnify a very close election again in
1968 when Nixon took a razor-thin plurality of the popular vote over Hubert
Humphrey...."); Ernest J. Brown, The New Age of Political Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
313, 318 (1969) (book review) ("Otherwise, our history of 180 years of presidential
elections-many of them with very close popular votes, as in 1960 and 1968-indicates
that an electoral majority follows a popular majority or plurality ...."); Robert J. Giuffra,
Jr., A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 58 STAN. L. REV, 1675, 1677 (2006)
("By November [1968], after a close election, Richard Nixon was elected president, and
the rest is history."); Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism,
Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 234 (2011)
("The 2000 presidential election was well within that 1% margin ... as were the 1880,
1884, 1888, 1960, and 1968 elections."); Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The
Framers, Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2537 (2001)
("As a tangible illustration of this point, consider the difference between Hubert
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the unreal nature of the statute was the DOJ's steadfast refusal to use
or even acknowledge it for three decades after its enactment,22 9 and
the entire legal academy's view of it being a Congressional affront to
the Court itself, forcing the Court to act in self-defense to preserve its
own legitimacy. 20 In fact, President Johnson included a signing
statement on the law that purported to undo its terms and reinstate
Miranda, declaring that Miranda warnings would continue as
before.23 1 Few statutes in recent memory have had a more dubious
origin or history. Dickerson is not a very representative example of a
statute undergoing judicial review.
Interestingly, the Court in Dickerson avoided saying that the
statute's actual terms violated the Fifth Amendment. Instead, it
acknowledged that § 3501 accurately reflected the Supreme Court's
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence up to Miranda.232 The end of its
opinion mentions that the § 3501 rule would be much more
complicated for police to learn and implement than the robotic
reading of preprinted Miranda rights.233  At most, therefore,
Dickerson seems to stand for the proposition that in special
circumstances, the Court will find that other factors outweigh the
intent of the legislature; Miranda is simply too entrenched, and the
statute too retrograde, to endorse such a drastic change. Yet this does
not mean that the Court finds the intent of Congress insignificant;
instead, the Dickerson opinion is a pained defense for why this case is
exceptional and why the statute is untenable. Dickerson is the
exception, not the rule, as far as the influence of separation of powers
in criminal procedure analysis is concerned.
If the Court were to adopt a new approach to consent for police
search, overruling Bustamonte, it would create almost a nearly
antithetical scenario to that in Dickerson. The Court would have to
jettison the entrenched case rather than preserve the status quo; and
the statute, rather than forcing radical change, would be in line with
the existing regime. An additional factor distinguishing Dickerson
from any potential case regarding informed consent is that the former
Humphrey's narrow popular-vote/substantial electoral college loss in 1968 and John F.
Kennedy's narrow popular-vote/substantial electoral college victory in 1960."). For an
excellent history of the Congressional response to Miranda that ultimately produced the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, see also Cassell, supra note 26, at 194-96.
229. See STARR, supra note 27, at 206.
230. See id. at 205-06.
231. See Cassell, supra note 26, at 198 (citing 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 983 (June
24, 1968)).
232. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436-37 (2000).
233. See id. at 444.
2120 [Vol. 90
2012] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLA TURES
pertains to Fifth Amendment protections and the latter to the Fourth
Amendment; the Court has noted that these two Amendments do not
merit the same level of judicial protections .2 4 Finally, Dickerson
essentially reaffirms the Miranda decision, and Miranda explicitly
offers state legislatures the opportunity to codify provisions that
could serve as adequate substitutes for the Court's prophylactic rule:
"Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for
the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described
above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.
235
Even so, the Court does occasionally hold that statutes, including
state statutes, violate the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Payton
v. New York,236 the Court noted that twenty-three states allowed for
warrantless arrests of suspects in their homes23 but held to the
contrary.238 The case itself was a challenge to a New York statute.239
Yet the Court did not treat this as an easy case. The Payton opinion
documents at great length the split in common law authorities on the
question of home arrests, 240 and then catalogs how many states have
come down for or against warrantless arrests, with a comprehensive
breakdown of whether these decisions were legislative or judicial.241
The Court conceded that "the weight of state-law authority [was]
clear '242 and contrary to the Court's decision, and declared that it was
not brushing this aside lightly; the Court considered this as a factor.243
In fact, the Court still found a way to ground its decision partly on
deference to the states, claiming that the "trend" is in the direction of
requiring warrants: "Only 24 of the 50 States currently sanction
warrantless entries into the home to arrest, and there is an obvious
declining trend. Further, the strength of the trend is greater than the
numbers alone indicate."
244
234. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1973) ("There is a vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment.").
235. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
236. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
237. See id. at 598 & n.46.
238. See id. at 576.
239. See id. at 576-78.
240. See id. at 591-98.
241. See id. at 598-99.
242. Id. at 600.
243. See id.
244. Id. (citation omitted).
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Payton, then, seems at first blush to be an obvious counter-
example to the argument advanced in this Article that the Supreme
Court should give some deference to state legislation related to
searches and seizures. At the same time, however, it arguably shows
that the Court does not take state law lightly, but rather goes to extra
pains to justify invalidating it. Even though the state statute involved
in Payton did not survive, along the way the Court tacitly
acknowledged that state legislation carries some weight.2 45 The Court
considered this as one factor in its analysis.2 46
B. Separation of Powers and Judicial Deference
The usual arguments in favor of separation of powers-or
judicial deference to legislatures-would apply here. The elected
legislature represents the citizenry more directly than does the
judiciary. Tradeoffs between individual civil liberties and public
safety should reflect current societal values, and the majoritarian
legislature is best able to capture the values of its constituents.2 47
Arguably, the majority itself knows best what the majority of citizens
understand when they consent to searches. Legislators have greater
political accountability for their decisions.24  Structurally, the
Constitution vests primary lawmaking authority in the legislative
branch.249 Staying within the confines of this structure is necessary for
the Constitution's preservation. This is the traditional democratic
argument.250
Even in cases where the judiciary is reviewing administrative
agency actions, bureaucratic actions that are primarily legislative
(regulatory rulemaking) receive greater deference than agency
adjudications or enforcement. 25 1 The general applicability and
245. See Note, State Law as "Other Law": Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal
Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1676 (2007).
246. See id.
247. See generally Worf, supra note 11, at 110-30 (discussing the differing roles of the
courts and the legislature in representing citizens and why the legislature is better able to
promote the values of the citizenry).
248. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1376-86 (2006) (setting forth the democratic arguments for legislative preeminence
and against judicial review).
249. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. For an excellent discussion of legislative structuralism,
see generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124
HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011).
250. See Waldron, supra note 248, at 1361-62.
251. See generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (holding
that setting maximum rail-car charges was not a government action that required
individualized hearings on the record); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
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prospective nature of rulemaking presents less threat of government
abuse or unfairness than individualized decisions and retrospective
factfinding. 2 2 This is a well-settled principle in administrative law,
and from a standpoint of symmetry, it seems that courts should treat
legislation more deferentially than other state actions.253
Legislation pertaining to criminal procedure also provides a
benefit to defendants: it streamlines the disposition of criminal
cases.254 When the admissibility of certain evidence is clear, courts can
move more quickly to the merits of the case and a verdict, rather than
subjecting criminal defendants to longer, less predictable, and more
costly litigation to prove their innocence. This benefit is skewed
toward defendants who are actually innocent, of course; those
acquitted would rather have such verdicts come faster, while the
guilty benefit disproportionately from delays, postponing their
punishment accordingly.
There is also a safety-in-numbers argument for trusting the
collective judgments of a legislature over those of a tribunal like the
Supreme Court.255 Whether expressed as the wisdom of crowds256 idea
or the Condorcet Jury Theorem,257 commentators have urged that
239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that there is no right to individualized hearings challenging
an increase in the mill rate for all property taxes); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373
(1908) (holding that there is a right to a hearing to challenge an individualized imposition
of special taxes).
252. See Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615, 621-22 (2000).
253. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 427 (noting the many benefits offered by statutes as
opposed to case law, for example).
254. See People v. Eid, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Berger,
856 P.2d 552, 554 (Mont. 1993); People v. France, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1994);
State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771,778 (Utah 2007); see also Harrison, supra note 5, at 427-
28 (noting how consent statutes, for example, can encourage predictability and certainty in
criminal procedure).
255. See Worf, supra note 11, at 110-19.
256. See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3-22 (2004) (discussing
laboratory and real-life examples of how the judgment of crowds can be surprisingly
effective); Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2009) ("The
Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that if people are better than random guessers, the
likelihood that the majority view will be correct increases toward 100 percent as the size of
the group expands."). For discussion of the "wisdom of crowds" in other legal contexts,
see Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 966 (2009) (discussing multi-judge panels);
Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 63,101-02 (2007) (detailing the "wisdom of crowds" argument).
257. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1462-64 (2011) (noting that the "recent trend in both the
scholarly and popular literatures on public decisionmaking emphasizes the advantages of
aggregating dispersed information from a large number of parties, as an alternative (or
supplement) to reliance on a smaller number of expert decisionmakers"); Adrian
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larger groups make better decisions, at least on certain subjects, and
this could apply to gauging how "voluntary" it is when people consent
to a search. In addition, such legislation provides clearer, more stable
guidance to police than the vagaries of fact-intensive appellate court
decisions.2 58 The long, steady tenure of the statute, and its succinct,
explicit text, are easier for police to master and follow over time.259 In
contrast, police are more likely to misunderstand or misapply an ever-
evolving line of court cases, applying rules ad-hoc to the facts of each
case at hand.260
There is also significant historical support for the idea that the
Supreme Court should treat state legislation differently than it treats
decisions by state courts or executives. Until 1938, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to require the Court to give
deference to state legislation but not state common law. 26' The
Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term: Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution,
123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (2009) ("[Ai majority of the group will, given the other
conditions of the Theorem, necessarily prove more competent than the average individual
and perhaps even more competent than the most competent individual."); Waldron, supra
note 248, at 1392. For applications of the Condorcet Theorem in related domains, see Paul
H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 327 (2002) (explaining that the Condorcet Theorem "holds that a majority vote
among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote
correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome"); Sunstein, supra note 256, at
1065-66 (discussing trimming in light of the Condorcet Jury Theorem); Adrian Vermeule,
Should we Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1586 (2007) (arguing for lay justices
on the Supreme Court). Condorcet corresponded with the Framers of the Constitution
and probably had some degree of influence on the Constitution's structure and terms. See
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to the Law of
Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1287-92 (2007).
258. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1335, 1374 (2001) ("There is no reason why the Court, as opposed to Congress, necessarily
should have the last word on these matters. What police are doing now, and what rules are
easy for them to apply, are general questions to which legislatures are better suited to
provide answers. Legislatures have experts available to them and advantages stemming
from their political accountability.").
259. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 427.
260. For similar arguments, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-658 (1984)
(arguing that the public safety exception would be easier for police to apply than an on-
the-scene, fact-based determination); Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier-The
International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for
a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1766 (2002) (noting that a benefit
of the Miranda rule is its easy application by police officers); Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking
the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-
Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 527 (2005) (proposing an "objective penalties test"
that would be easier for officers to apply while on the job).
261. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842) ("The laws of a state are more usually
understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority
thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws.").
2012] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES
adoption of the Erie doctrine gave proper place to state common
law,262 but this was in the context of what law to apply, as opposed to
reviewing the legitimacy of the state law itself. Post-Erie
jurisprudence did not change the fact that the Court had long
recognized a significant conceptual distinction between state
legislation and other genres of state law.263
C. State Legislatures as Persuasive Authority
Even apart from cases where the Supreme Court has directly
addressed the constitutionality of a statute, the Court has referred to
other state legislation as a type of persuasive authority, citing state
laws that anticipated the Court's eventual move on a point about civil
liberties or due process rights. In Tennessee v. Garner,6 for example,
Justice White noted: "In evaluating the reasonableness of police
procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have also looked to
prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions. 265
In contrast, state executive guidelines, such as law enforcement
manuals, are more likely to appear as a parade of horribles whose
cumulative effect is an invitation for the Court to intervene. The
seeming reverence with which the Court cites state statutes-those
that are relevant but not directly under consideration-suggests that
it would have a different starting place in deciding whether to strike
down a piece of state legislation as opposed to mere police practices.
For example, in Watson, discussed in the previous subsection, the
Court supported its holding by observing approvingly that
authorization for warrantless arrests based on probable cause existed
"in almost all of the States in the form of express statutory
authorization. ' 266 In Payton v. New York, as discussed above, the
Court also acknowledged that the legislation of the states could be
"evidence of constitutional validity," '267 but found that the rule
adopted by a few of the legislatures was not unanimous enough to
outweigh special countervailing factors. 68 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court
noted that a number of states had already adopted an exclusionary
262. See CATHERINE M. DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO
PRIVATE PARTIES 293 (Oxford 2007).
263. See id.
264. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
265. Id. at 15-16.
266. 423 U.S. 411, 422 (1976).
267. Note, supra note 245, at 1676.
268. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600-601 (1980); see also Note, supra note
245, at 1676.
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rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and this became part of its justification in imposing the exclusionary
rule on all the states. 26
9
The same is true when the Court applies other amendments from
the Bill of Rights.27 In Sixth Amendment cases, such as Ring v.
Arizona,27' Williams v. Florida,72 and Burch v. Louisiana,273 the
Supreme Court has relied in part on the fact that states legislatures
adopted a particular rule.274 In the Eighth Amendment arena, the
Court declared that the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures."275 That same year, in Stanford v. Kentucky,276 the Court
announced that "first among the objective indicia that reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction are statutes passed by
society's elected representatives." '277 In McCleskey v. Kemp,278 the
Court discussed the fact that thirty-five state legislatures had re-
enacted death penalty legislation in response to prior Supreme Court
decisions.279 Then, in Roper v. Simmons 280 and Atkins v. Virginia,2
81
the Court reversed its own decisions in Stanford and Penry after
concluding that the consensus among state legislatures had shifted. 82
Even in Fourteenth Amendment cases, the Court treats state
legislatures as persuasive authority.283 One striking example is the
Court's reliance on the majority view among state legislatures in
269. See 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961); see also Note, supra note 245, at 1676 (observing that
in Mapp the Court demonstrated a respect for state autonomy).
270. See Note, supra note 245, at 1676-1679 (discussing the use of state legislation to
determine the scope of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments).
271. 536 U.S. 584, 607-08 (2002) (noting that "the great majority of States responded
to this Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating
circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury").
272. 399 U.S. 78, 98-99 (1970) (devoting a footnote spanning two pages to a survey of
state legislation on the point).
273. 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (noting the near uniformity of state rules pertaining to
unanimous jury verdict requirements for small juries).
274. Justice Harlan even included a "poll" of state legislation as an appendix to his
opinion in Baldwin v. New York and Williams. 399 U.S. 117, 138-44 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting in No. 188 and concurring in the result in No. 927).
275. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
276. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
277. Id. at 370 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
278. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
279. See id. at 301.
280. 543 U.S. 551, 564-568 (2005).
281. 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002).
282. See Note, supra note 245, at 1679.
283. For more discussion, see id. at 1674-75.
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upholding a sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 4 followed by a
similar reliance on state legislative trends in reversing that decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.28 5 Similarly, the Court struck down an abortion
consent law partly because it deviated from the vast majority of other
states' statutes in Hodgson v. Minnesota.286 It also treated state
legislatures as persuasive authority in striking down Washington's law
regarding child visitation rights in Troxel v. Granville,287 and in
upholding Washington's anti-suicide statute in Washington v.
Glucksberg.88
Not only do legislatures influence and inform the rules that the
Supreme Court adopts, but the presence of legislative-type rules can
move the Court to refrain from imposing further procedural
protections. In the context of federal enforcement agencies, the Court
has also suggested that the presence of rules or regulations protecting
civil liberties makes the exclusionary rule less necessary, a logic that
would seem to be even more applicable to legislative regulation of
police conduct. This point arose in the context of the Court declining
to extend the exclusionary rule to immigrant deportation hearings in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,2 89 based on the concept of marginal
deterrence. 290 The Court concluded that existing regulations already
did part of the job that the exclusionary rule purports to do: "The
[Immigration and Naturalization Service]'s attention to Fourth
Amendment interests cannot guarantee that constitutional violations
will not occur, but it does reduce the likely deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule. Deterrence must be measured at the margin. "291
Marginal deterrence analysis2 9g would probably find that the existence
284. 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
285. 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
286. 497 U.S. 417, 425 n.5,454 (1990).
287. 530 U.S. 57, 69-72 (2000).
288. 521 U.S. 702, 710-19, 723 (1997).
289. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
290. See id. at 1044-46; for excellent discussion, see Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive
Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless
Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 523 (2011).
291. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045.
292. In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied upon the concept of
"marginal deterrence," that is, the additional incremental deterrent effect (discouraging
police misconduct) that an extension of the exclusionary rule would provide. See, e.g.,
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 796 (2009); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695,
700-701 (2009); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 444-46 (2008) (applying the concept
of marginal deterrence to the death penalty); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 208 (1998); Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 112 (1982) (applying the marginal
deterrence logic to campaign contribution disclosure requirements); United States v. Janis,
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of a statute governing the police conduct in question weighs against
applying the exclusionary rule. That is, the incremental benefit of
evidence exclusion in the case of uninformed consent (as measured by
reduced overreaching by law enforcement, for example) is lower
where there is a state statute already cabining in policy activity in this
regard, albeit not to the extent the Court would want. Comparing
scenarios where the police self-regulate with those where a statute
imposes some standards, however minimal, the impact of the
exclusionary rule seems far greater in the former scenario than the
latter.293 Typically, the choice for the courts is between letting the
police self-regulate and having the courts step in to provide oversight.
A criminal procedure statute, however, provides another source of
oversight or regulation of police conduct besides the police
themselves.
428 U.S. 433, 450-54 (1976) ("Assuming this efficacy, the additional marginal deterrence
provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a civil proceeding
surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that situation.").
Marginal deterrence first entered the Supreme Court's opinions in Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 188-189 n.1 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the marginal deterrent effect of extending the exclusionary rule to certain
codefendants); see also Welsh S. White & Robert S. Greenspan, Standing to Object to
Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 354-55 (1970) (rejecting Justice Harlan's
"assumption that the new [exclusionary] rule would only 'marginally' increase ... [F]ourth
[A]mendment protection"). The term "marginal deterrence" was apparently coined in
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
In practice the Court weighs this marginal deterrent benefit (which is, by
definition, only incremental) against the social costs of the exclusionary rule, which,
according to the Court, include impediments to law enforcement, wrongful acquittal of
dangerous criminals, and the public's loss of trust in the legal system. See Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-594 (2006). In Hudson, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that a
violation of Michigan's "knock-and-announce" rule did not automatically require the
suppression of all evidence acquired during the subsequent search. See id. at 599. The
Court quoted language from their earlier decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 (1984), in weighing the "substantial social costs" that the exclusionary rule generates.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. Often the social cost that weighs most heavily on the justices is
that invoking the exclusionary rule often "include[s] setting the guilty free and the
dangerous at large." Id. at 591. The Court also emphasized "truth-seeking" and "law
enforcement objectives." Id. (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 364-365).
293. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-599 ("Another development over the past half-
century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces,
including a new emphasis on internal police discipline.... Numerous sources are now
available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of them under this
Court's cases, how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to
craft an effective regime for internal discipline."); see also Note, Retreat: The Supreme
Court and the New Police, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1718-1721 (2009) (discussing the
opposing views of Justice Scalia in the majority opinion of Hudson and Justice Breyer's
dissent on the subject of police self-regulation).
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D. Canons of Construction
Statutes require interpretation and construction, elements that
are absent when appellate courts are reviewing police decisions. Most
obvious are the canons that prescribe judicial deference to legislation,
such as the avoidance canon or the doctrine of severability. Even if
one rejects the idea that courts intentionally give greater deference to
legislation in Fourth Amendment analysis, this result can come
inadvertently merely because of the standard process of judicial
interpretation. The process of judicial review makes it less likely that
a court will reach the issue of a statute's validity, and less probable
that invalidation will occur even if it does, considering it from a
purely practical standpoint. Were the Supreme Court to review a
state statute, for example, these canons weigh in favor of upholding
and preserving it as much as possible, or at least avoiding the need to
invalidate it.
In addition, the nature of textual enactments-the ambiguity
inherent in all written language-allows a court to construe a
borderline statute in a way that fits the constitutional framework,
even if this involves stretching the meaning a bit. At the same time,
not all legislation receives equal treatment when it comes to judicial
deference. This is especially true for statutes that are primarily
definitional, rather than proscriptive or injunctive; definitional
statutes are inherently more likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
1. Avoidance and Severability
The avoidance canon294 is the jurisprudential rule of thumb that
instructs courts to avoid reaching constitutional issues in a case if they
can dispose of the dispute on the merits or, better yet, on technical or
procedural grounds.295 This is partly to practice judicial restraint,
294. For background discussion on the avoidance cannon, see generally Philip P.
Frickey, Getting From Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 397 (2005) (discussing the development of the avoidance cannon throughout the
twentieth century); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
"Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (discussing the relationship
between the avoidance cannon and the Erie Doctrine); Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997) (defending doctrines of avoidance and
severability, but arguing that modern applications of each doctrine have become mutually
exclusive).
295. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1333
(2010) ("The avoidance canon, however, 'is a tool for choosing between competing
plausible interpretations of a statutory text.' " (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,
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partly to preserve stability in the domain of constitutional law by
avoiding innovations and disruptions, and partly to make reversal by
a higher appellate court (or a subsequent, differently-membered
Supreme Court) less likely. Avoidance is one of the least
controversial canons of construction, generally in favor with the
judiciary and commentators alike.
The avoidance canon, however, allows for some strategic
legislating in anticipation of judicial review. Statutes are, in effect,
more likely to remain untouched by judicial review than executive
decisions or other state action. Often courts will find a procedural
basis to dispose of the case and leave the questionable statutory
provision for another day.296 A legislature can predict that codifying a
particular rule of criminal procedure could make its approach more
permanent because courts are predisposed to avoid reaching the
question of a statute's constitutionality. In a related vein, the
381 (2005))); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 213 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[C]onstitutional avoidance.., allows a court to dispose of an
entire case on grounds that do not require the court to pass on a statute's
constitutionality." (citations omitted)); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008)
("Under the avoidance canon, 'when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one
of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.'" (quoting Harris v. United States,
536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002))).
296. See United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 868-69 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (advocating for avoiding the constitutionality of a statute by
interpreting the procedural provisions to make the statute inapplicable); Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust.: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering
the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1310 (2005) ("[T]he Court deploys procedural
doctrines to avoid decisions that might settle controversial issues prematurely ...."); Lisa
A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1063 (1994)
("In such instances, failure to adhere to a state procedural rule is often deemed an
adequate basis to avoid Supreme Court review of a federal constitutional claim. State
procedural law is thus allowed to frustrate federal constitutional rights because of the
decision to respect state procedural rules."); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85
GEo. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997) ("The first category [of avoidance by courts] may be termed
'procedural avoidance.' This is perhaps the most general and protean category of
avoidance principles, but the core tenet is that courts should order the issues for
adjudication, or the rules that determine the forum in which a case should proceed, with
an eye to obviating the need to render constitutional rulings on the merits."). But see
Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 610 n.10 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting instances where courts
ruled on the merits because the substantive law was actually clearer than the procedural
question at issue in the case); Zaffuto v. Peregrine Health Management, 280 F.R.D. 96
(2012) (noting a preference in the Second Circuit for resolving cases on the merits rather
than procedural grounds).
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Supreme Court has used the avoidance canon repeatedly to skirt
Bustamonte-related issues.297
The doctrine of severability 98 is almost a corollary of the
avoidance canon. Severability in this sense refers to a court severing
only the unconstitutional portion or phrase of a statute and
preserving the remainder, when avoiding the constitutional issue is
impossible. In other words, this is a minimalist approach to
invalidation, where the court treats subsections and clauses as
removable component parts. Severance is not always possible, of
course; sometimes the statute becomes meaningless, or functionally
inoperative, without the unconstitutional section. Many statutes
include a "severability clause" to try to bind reviewing courts into
preserving as much of the statute as possible if one section happens to
be invalid.299
The severability doctrine, like the avoidance canon, lends some
staying power to a statute, allowing a court to excise only parts of it
297. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n.3 (2006) ("Because we find that
the search at issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we
need not reach the issue whether 'acceptance of the search condition constituted
consent ......."); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) ("Because we do
not reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to consent, we
necessarily assume for purposes of our decision-as did the Court of Appeals-that the
searches were conducted without the informed consent of the patients."); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 594 n.10 (1974) ("Inasmuch as we hold the seizure to be justified
under Chambers, we do not reach the issue of Lewis' consent.").
298. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993)
(providing an overview of the concept of severability and discussing the confusing nature
of the jurisprudence surrounding severability); Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability
Doctrine: How much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. LAW &
POL. 1 (2011) (discussing the concepts underlying severability and the proper approach to
applying the doctrine); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738
(2010) (proposing an improved model for applying severability in practice).
299. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 331
(2006) (discussing the severability clause in New Hampshire's Parental Notification Prior
to Abortion Act); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 398-99 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the severability clause in a federal immigration statute); Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 882-83 (1997) (discussing the severability clauses of the
Communications Decency Act); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 140 (1996) (per curiam)
(discussing the severability clauses in Utah's anti-abortion statute); United States v. Nat'l
Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 487-88 (1995) (discussing the absence of a
severability clause in Ethics in Government Act); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 549 (1993) (including a severability clause in the appendix
to the opinion of the court). Note that statutes sometimes contain inseverability clauses to
try to ward off partial invalidation by forcing reviewing courts to make a more drastic, all-
or-nothing choice. See, e.g., Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 970-981 (Pa. 2006)
(holding a nonseverability clause of a Pennsylvania statute ineffective); see generally Fred
Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 28 STATUTE L. REV. 131 (2007)
(discussing the constitutionality of certain types of inseverability clauses).
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while leaving the rest intact. For criminal procedure statutes in
general, the severance canon functions as another impediment to
judicial invalidation.
This point about the avoidance canon and the doctrine of
severability is both descriptive and normative; it describes the path
courts usually take when confronted with a challenge to the validity
of a piece of legislation.
2. Text and Ambiguity
Even where a court cannot avoid the constitutional issue, and
where severance is not feasible for the statute under consideration, a
court can often dodge the invalidation option by construing the
language to mean whatever will keep it within constitutional
bounds.3"0 Unlike the police actions that usually give rise to Fourth
Amendment challenges, legislation is simply text, and all text contains
some ambiguity that allows room for judicial interpretation.
Interpretation provides an alternative to invalidation; a court can
'"cure" a perceived constitutional defect by interpreting the statute
either very broadly or very narrowly.3 1 Discrete police actions lack
this advantage. Executive actions do not present the same
opportunity to "cure" the constitutional deficiency; courts simply
have more options for saving statutes. Laws have a continuing
existence and are always somewhat malleable; executive actions are
fixtures of the past.
Assessing the validity of texts is a different enterprise than
evaluating the legality of police conduct or other government actions.
Determining the constitutionality of a state statute always involves
interpretation of its words and phrases. The interpretive approach
that a court adopts can often drive the conclusion, either by deriving a
meaning that comports with constitutional guidelines or by forcing a
reading that runs afoul. Even where a court does not see itself bound
to give greater deference to the legislature in a situation, the nature of
legislative text-the inherent semantic-provides leeway for a statute
to elude invalidation.
Legislation contains both verbal and grammatical ambiguity or
imprecision; hence the lengthy repertoire of interpretive canons like
300. See Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a Republic of Statutes, 2010 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 837, 857-58 (2010).
301. For an example of this logic, see Justice Alito's dissent from this term in United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1595 n.4 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("While the term
'serious' may also mean 'weighty' or 'important,' we should adopt the former definition if
necessary to avoid unconstitutionality." (citations omitted)).
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the last antecedent rule,3" ejusdem generis, °3 in pari materia,3
expressio unius, 305 and rules about other statutes being incorporated
by reference, all of which address grammatical imprecision. The rules
for "may/shall" and "and/or" address verbal confusion. A court
employing these canons can often obtain the result it desires, not
because the canons enable skewing of the results, but because the
language does; the canons are merely labels for what type of
interpretive logic the court is using.
302. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 425-26 (2009) ("[T]he Court of
Appeals invoked the 'rule of the last antecedent,' under which 'a limiting clause or
phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows.' " (citations omitted)).
303. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2011)
(discussing whether the canon applies to the present case); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 223-27 (2008) (discussing whether the canon applies to the case under
consideration); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (informing the
interpretive discussion through the ejusdem generis canon); see also Ariela R. Dubler,
Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 761-62 (2006)
(explaining the application of the canon to immigration statutes); Gregory R. Englert, The
Other Side of Ejusdem Generis, 11 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51 (2007) (discussing the
canon in detail); BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting
Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 190 (2010) (describing the
treatment in the Senate Manual on legislative drafting of the canon).
304. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 638 (2009) ("This
Court has consistently held that § 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), thus
limiting the remands barred from appellate review by § 1447(d) to those that are based on
a ground specified in § 1447(c)."); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S.
224, 229 (2007); Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313-16 (2006)
(discussing the canon in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction); see also Josh Chafetz,
Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 754 (2012) ("Hence, the Speech or
Debate Clause's prohibition on punishing members 'in any other Place' for their
congressional speech acts must be read in pari materia with the provision that '[e]ach
House may... punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.' "); Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J. 1168, 1171 (2012) (discussing the application of in pari
materia to the reading of the twenty-sixth amendment).
305. See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (2012) (discussing applicability of
the canon); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (2011); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 678 (2007); Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
529 U.S. 576, 582-83 (2000); see also Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional
Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1488 (2012) (discussing
the application of the canon to 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the
Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2026 (2011) (offering a
definition of the canon); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political
Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1211 (2010) (discussing expressio
unius in the context of efficient legislative drafting); John Harrison, Enumerated Federal
Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1123 (2011)
(applying the canon to the Constitution's enumeration of powers).
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3. Definition Statutes
Some criminal procedure statutes are primarily definitional, and
as such, are inherently more likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. This genre of legislative text presents special practical issues
for reviewing courts.306 Compared to other legislative forms,
definitional statutes are further away along a continuum from regular
state action, that is, executive exercises of power.30 7
Proscriptive or prescriptive statutes in criminal procedure
actually mandate (or forbid) specific actions by law enforcement. This
gives the statute close connection to "state action." The Supreme
Court's incorporation rubric-applying the Bill of Rights to the states
via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-
anticipates through its verbiage discrete, individualized action on the
state's part.30 8 An important linguistic difference between the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the shift
from passive to active voice.309 The latter, which is the channel for
incorporating the former against the states, lends itself to active state
actions more easily. As the wording of the text frames the Court's
analysis, proscriptive statutes are a better fit for the incorporation
rubric, more susceptible than definitional statutes to assessment and
therefore to invalidation.310
306. See, e.g., Robert G. Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.
L. REV. 711, 721 (1984) (discussing complex issues with interpreting the state medical
malpractice statute); Sally Burnett Sharp, Step By Step: The Development of the
Distributive Consequences of Divorce in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2017, 2041-43
(1998) (discussing complex interpretive problems arising from legislative revision of North
Carolina's alimony statute).
307. See Hardy Myers & Philip Schradle, The Oregon Law Commission's Judicial
Review Act Project. A Reform Effort Still on the Horizon, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 275,
283 (2007) ("Definition sections have no legal force of their own, but only define the
meaning of words that are used in the operational sections of a law.").
308. See, e.g., Christopher B. McNeil, Executive Branch Adjudications in Public Safety
Laws: Assessing the Costs and Identifying the Benefits of ALJ Utilization in Public Safety
Legislation, 38 IND. L. REV. 435, 443 (2005).
309. The Fifth Amendment uses the passive voice: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). In
contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment uses the active voice: "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
310. See 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20:8
(7th ed. 2007) ("The definition of a term in the definitional section of a statute controls the
construction of that term wherever it appears throughout the statute. And a court must
follow a legislative definition unless the necessity for a different one shall 'clearly
appear.' ").
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On the other hand, definitional statutes seem to engage in the
very type of categorization or "deeming" that characterizes judicial
constitutional inquiries in general.31' This fact is a counterweight to
the previous point-the vast majority of constitutional criminal
procedure consists of the Court simply labeling certain state actions
as constitutionally valid or invalid. Nevertheless, the historical rule
has been that courts give particular deference to definitional statutes,
perhaps more so than other types of legislation.312
This creates a practical irony for a court reviewing such a
statute-the law is simultaneously harder to reach as an instance of
state action, but perhaps more irritating for the appellate judiciary
than other genres of legislation as it encroaches on the justices' turf.
In the end, however, the attenuated connection to unconstitutional
state action could often prevail in this tension.313 Put another way,
there is a dilution or spreading of responsibility between the
legislature endorsing certain searches, the police conducting searches,
and the trial court admitting evidence pursuant to statutory authority.
This dilution makes the constitutional analysis for a reviewing court
more oblique, which in turn makes the statute less susceptible to
adverse action such as invalidation.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Professor Rozenkranz has
recently demonstrated that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirement (for searches and seizures) targeted the Executive, not
Congress, 34 and that the probable cause requirement for warrants
targeted the judiciary, who alone would grant warrants in the federal
government.315 Rozenkranz observes that the distinctions become less
clear when courts incorporate the Fourth Amendment against
states 3 6 because some states authorize the state attorney general to
issue certain warrants,3"7 and many state judges are elected, not
311. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2103-08 (2002) (discussing the constitutionality of definition statutes
and arguing in support of them).
312. See SINGER, supra note 310 ("When a legislature defines the language it uses, its
definition is binding upon the court even though the definition does not coincide with the
ordinary meaning of the words." (citations omitted)).
313. See id. ("Although frequently asserted that the legislative function is to enact law
and the judicial function to apply and construe it, legislatures may nevertheless declare
how present and past legislation is to be construed without violating the separation of
powers." (citations omitted)).
314. See Rosenkranz, Objects of the Constitution, supra note 31, at 1034-36.
315. See id. at 1037-40.
316. See id. at 1063-64.
317. See id. at 1065.
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appointed for life terms. 318 Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment,
the only channel through which the Fourth Amendment applies to
states, interposes "state" as the subject and then employs two active
verbs-"make" and "enforce"-which appear to implicate the state
legislatures, judiciaries, and executives in what follows.3 19 Thus,
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment can drag all three
branches into a challenge for violating the Bill of Rights even where
only one branch of the federal government would have responsibility.
Even so, this does not remove the separation of powers issue from
incorporation analysis entirely, even if it blurs the lines. Moreover,
the court still has to deal with the verbiage of the Fourth Amendment
itself, which addresses non-legislative actions. Even with the explicit
reference to state legislation in the opening line of the Fourteenth
Amendment, links between a legislative enactment and an
unreasonable search remains attenuated. This is particularly true
where the statute itself merely sets the legal definition for
voluntariness of consent, rather than "making a law" that directly
deprives citizens of due process or the privileges and immunities of
citizenship.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court never invalidates a law
based on its definition section, but rather that when this occurs, it is
usually in substantive due process cases rather than procedural
challenges.3 z0 It is difficult to find cases where the Court invalidated a
definition statute apart from overbreadth or, less commonly,
unconstitutional vagueness. When the Court invalidates a law based
on its definition section, it seems more likely to do so because the
statute includes too much, not because of what is missing321-an
impermissible inclusion can jeopardize the constitutionality of a
statute, but a missing provision merely invites judicial construction
and gap-filling. Overbreadth and vagueness do not appear to be
present in statutes like section 15A-221(b) that define consent for
purposes of police searches.
318. See id. at 1064.
319. See id. at 1060-61.
320. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (addressing
overbreadth in definitions of Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law); United States
v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588-91 (2010) (discussing overbreadth in animal cruelty
statute); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 941-42 (2000) (discussing overbreadth in anti-
abortion statute).
321. City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393-94, 98 S.Ct.
1123, 1126-27 (1978) (illustrating an example of a case where a missing definition invited
judicial construction).
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III. APPLYING THE PARADIGM TO CONSENT STATUTES
This Part applies the foregoing discussion about deference to the
hypothetical question that launched the discussion: what would
happen to the North Carolina statute if the Supreme Court later
adopted a requirement of informed consent? The answer is that the
Court might actually defer to North Carolina's legislature and uphold
the statute, reaching a different result than it would if the case were
merely about state police protocols. Deference to the legislature,
even if not the dispositive factor, would be at least one of the issues
the Court could consider. Even if this expression of the legislature's
intent did not control the ultimate holding-which it might-it would
exert some influence on the Court's reasoning.
A. Separation of Powers
The core thesis of this Article is that courts should, and do, give
more deference (and have more mechanisms to show such deference)
when legislatures approach the boundary of Fourth Amendment
protections than when the executive branch does. Under our
hypothetical, therefore, the Supreme Court would face a different
situation if a challenge arose under North Carolina's consent statute
than if a similar case arose merely as part of another state's police
practices.
As mentioned above, probably the most common argument
against judicial deference to legislatures-the idea that the Bill of
Rights is supposed to be anti-majoritarian and protective of
persecuted minorities322-seems relatively inapplicable here. Nothing
about North Carolina's consent statute disadvantages any particular
group or class of society more than others, or even has the indirect
result of making one group face police searches more frequently. The
statute lacks any hint of majoritarian oppression of disempowered
groups or individuals. Of course, it is easy to imagine hypothetical
examples where a consent statute could unfairly oppress a minority
segment of society, such as requiring that refusals of consent be in
English or in writing, without restrictions on the consent side of the
equation. In such a case, incremental deference to the legislature
would surely give way to countervailing factors related to equal
protection; no one is arguing that the legislature has absolute power
322. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 901 (2006); Martin H. Redish & Colleen
McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1393 (2010).
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or unfettered discretion. There is room for moderate deference to
legislation with equal protection playing backstop for potential
abuses.
Similarly, from a civil libertarian standpoint, there is no evidence
that the law is enabling widespread police abuses or breaches of
privacy; as mentioned above, police in North Carolina routinely go
beyond the requirements of the statute and provide warnings, in
written form, of the right to refuse a search. 3 The statute has not
created any obvious gap in privacy protections that the Court would
need to plug.
A component of constitutional judicial review is the doctrine of
notice, a subset of due process.324 In terms of notice or forewarning,
the North Carolina consent statute3 25 arguably puts the population on
notice that consenting to a search makes any evidence discovered
admissible in a prosecution. This is not by any means an airtight or
standalone argument. The legislature could not, for example, enact
the Miranda warnings and thereby eliminate the need for police to
deliver those warnings individually and personally. Yet the consent
issue, as the Court explained at length in Bustamonte, is qualitatively
and quantitatively different from the confession issue that underlies
Miranda.326  Fourth Amendment protections are simply less
sacrosanct, and certainly less rigid, than Fifth Amendment
protections.327 Moreover, criminal confessions are far less frequent
than police requests to do a "quick look" around, making warning
requirements more feasible and manageable for the former.
The point is that the codification of the consent rule provides
some degree of notice and, at the least, somewhat weakens the
argument that the defendant was unaware of his right to refuse the
search and unaware of the consequences of consenting. By itself, this
is probably not a strong enough reason to uphold the statute if it
faced a constitutional challenge, but it is an additional consideration
supporting the idea that courts should give greater deference to
legislative acts than to other state action when analyzing Fourth
323. See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked
Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2202 (2006) (arguing
that uninformed consent rules allow citizens to assert their personal rights more
effectively).
324. See generally Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1585-93 (2005) (discussing the purpose of the notice
requirement).
325. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-221 to -222 (2011).
326. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232, 246-247 (1973).
327. See id. at 248.
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Amendment rights.328 Legislation differs from the other (more
common) actions that furnish the basis of such challenges, like police
practices or customs, in that legislation provides official notice to the
citizenry of what to expect. This is not the sole factor to determine the
outcome, but it is still one valid factor among many. This principle
about notice has broad applications for many areas of criminal
procedure, and merits more investigation in future scholarly
research.329
B. Canons of Construction
In addition to the foregoing separation of powers arguments, the
fact that North Carolina has a statute presents some logistical or
pragmatic issues that push in this same direction. Were the Supreme
Court to review North Carolina's consent statute, the canons of
judicial avoidance and severability33° would weigh in favor of
upholding the statute or preserving as much of it as possible,
respectively, which would probably avert the need to invalidate it.
Even apart from the idea of courts explicitly deferring to legislatures
in Fourth Amendment analysis, the very process of judicial review
makes it less likely that a court will reach the issue of a statute's
validity than would be the case with other forms of state action.331
From a structural standpoint, it is therefore less probable that
invalidation will occur.
Related to the avoidance canon, the severability doctrine also
bolsters the staying power of North Carolina's consent statute,
allowing a court to excise only parts of it while leaving the rest intact.
Of course, given that the most likely constitutional challenge to this
statute would be over what is missing-a warning requirement-
rather than what is there, severance is less likely to be relevant than
avoidance. Avoidance and severability would be factors in the judicial
review of North Carolina's consent statute, as they would be with any
state statute that codified an element of criminal procedure.
328. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) ("[C]ourts must accord
substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress .... Congress is far better
equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing on
[complex issues]." (quoting Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 331 n.12 (1985))).
329. See Stevenson, supra note 324, at 1536 (noting that paradoxes relating to the
notice requirement have been inadequately discussed).
330. See supra Part II.D and sources cited therein.
331. See supra Part II.D and sources cited therein.
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As mentioned above, section 15A-221(b) of North Carolina's
consent statute is purely definitional,332 rather than proscriptive or
injunctive, and is therefore inherently more likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Courts traditionally give especially high
deference to definitional statutes, even where this creates friction
with the court's policy preferences.33 The fact that the statute is
formatted mostly in definitional terms makes it more likely to receive
favorable judicial treatment.
To summarize, in the hypothetical scenario in which the Supreme
Court was reviewing North Carolina's consent statute, and in the
context of moving toward a policy of requiring consent, it seems that
the Court would treat this differently than it would the same practice
that was merely a policy of a law enforcement agency. The Court
historically has given legislation more deference in the criminal
procedure arena than police practices. Canons of interpretation, such
as the avoidance canon and the severability doctrine, create structural
bulwarks for legislation that are absent in other state action contexts.
Finally, the fact that North Carolina's law primarily takes the form of
a definitional statute would give it an additional strategic advantage
in surviving judicial review.
CONCLUSION
By using legislation to bring its criminal procedure rules into line
with the Supreme Court's holdings throughout the 1960s and early
70s, North Carolina took a risk that its statutes might lose this
alignment as the Court's jurisprudence continued to evolve. Its
consent statute may currently be in step with the Bustamonte rule,
and a conflict is unlikely to develop anytime soon. There is, of course,
room for debate about what practical difference a warning
requirement would make in day-to-day law enforcement, given that
many North Carolina police already use preprinted consent forms,
and the experience of the few states already experimenting with such
requirements has generated no reports of epic changes in their
criminal justice systems.
332. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-221(b) (2011) (defining consent as "a statement to the
officer, made voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of G.S. 15A-222, giving
the officer permission to make a search"). For another local example of a definition
section of a statute featured in an appellate court's decision, see Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N.C. 469, 475, 91 S.E.2d 246,251 (1956).
333. See supra Part I.D.3.
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Despite this uncertainty about the impact of a rule change, there
remain important questions about the prospect of judicial review of
North Carolina's statute, and these questions have far-reaching
implications for other areas of criminal procedure that states might
regulate legislatively. Even if a conflict emerges between the Supreme
Court's preferences and a state's legislation about police procedure, it
is too simplistic to say that the Court would automatically invalidate
any statute that stood in the way of its policy ideals. Deference to
legislation, whether as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence or the
pragmatics of interpretation, would have some bearing on the Court's
analysis-if not as the dispositive factor, at least as one of the issues
the Court considers. The fact that a state has codified its rules for
voluntary consent should make the analysis different from a case
arising in another state where police were following executive-branch
protocols. Even if this legislative fact does not change the ultimate
holding-which it might-it would at least exert some influence on
the Court's reasoning. Moreover, the larger issue here applies far
beyond the context of consent to a search-it could apply to any area
where states codify a holding of the Supreme Court that later changes
or narrows.
This Article has both a descriptive and a normative goal. Of the
two, the descriptive aim is the more aggressive: to challenge the
conventional wisdom about the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the
separation of powers has been a missing topic of discussion in both
the relevant literature and in judicial opinions. Moreover, this is a
missing piece in many areas of criminal procedure, and the analysis
offered here could have significant implications. The normative point
of this Article is more modest: courts should pay attention to what
type of state action is at issue in a constitutional criminal procedure
case, whether it is legislative, executive, or judicial. It matters, from a
policy standpoint, whether the state legislature has addressed the
issue, or if the police are essentially self-regulating. The legislative-
executive dichotomy also poses pragmatic, logistical issues for judicial
review, as legislative text is more resilient against invalidation or
judicial disapproval, due to canons of construction and the linguistic
features of statutes. The presence of legislation may not outweigh all
other issues or policy concerns, but it should factor into the analysis
along with other concerns.
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